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ABSTRACT
The text, structure, and history of the Intellectual Property Clause
(IP Clause), as well as subsequent governmental activity, Supreme
Court doctrine, and policy, show that the IP Clause limits Congress
from using any of its other powers “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts” through laws that reach beyond the power
conferred by the IP Clause to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” That is, the evidence marshaled by this Article shows
that the IP Clause externally limits Congress from seeking, via
legislation, to promote the progress of science and useful arts, in any
way other than by enacting laws that secure to authors and inventors
exclusive rights in their writings and discoveries for limited times. Yet
the story of Congress’s power in this area has another side: Since the
late twentieth century, Congress has increasingly reached beyond the
IP Clause’s means to promote the Clause’s ends, often asserting its
expansive—and less limited—commerce and treaty powers. To some
degree, this shift reflects the fact that laws regulating intellectual
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property often have multiple purposes, including trade and foreignrelations interests, which sometimes point in more expansive
directions than do those of the more limited IP Clause. This Article
synthesizes these competing purposes and provides an analytical
framework under which courts, legislators, and others can assess the
constitutionality of federal legislation. This framework affords a
presumption against the constitutionality of laws that promote the IP
Clause’s ends but subvert its means, a presumption that may be
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that Congress,
pursuant to its other more permissive powers, intentionally chose to
supersede the IP Clause’s means because of paramount, legitimate
interests. This framework suggests that a number of existing federal
laws, such as federal trade-secrecy provisions and antibootlegging
laws, might be unconstitutional. The framework also suggests how to
assess the constitutionality of laws that would protect databases, laws
passed pursuant to international agreements with other countries, and
laws that establish federal funding for scientific and artistic works.
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INTRODUCTION
Could Congress enact perpetual copyright or patent protection?
Could it grant copyright or patent rights to an entity other than a
work’s author or inventor, respectively? Could it protect against the
copying of works that are not fixed in a tangible medium? A look at
the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause (IP Clause) alone
suggests a probable-to-definite no to each of these questions. The IP
Clause empowers Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
1
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
The power contemplated by the IP Clause, however, is not the
only power that the Constitution confers on Congress. Most
expansively, the Constitution also enables Congress, under the
Commerce Clause, “To regulate Commerce . . . among the several
2
States.” Moreover, the Constitution grants Congress authority to
spend money in certain ways to “provide for the . . . general Welfare
3
of the United States” and to “make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution” the federal government’s
4
enumerated powers. The Constitution also grants one house of
5
Congress, the Senate, a considerable role in treatymaking. To the
extent that congressional action fails to conform to the requirements
of the IP Clause, then, could Congress nevertheless define or regulate
rights in intellectual property by enacting any of the aforementioned
expansive laws under these other powers?
This Article relies on the text, structure, and history of the IP
Clause, as well as subsequent governmental activity, Supreme Court
doctrine, and policy, to show that the IP Clause is set up to limit
Congress from using any of its other Article I powers “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” through laws that would
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As a term, “the IP Clause” is inaccurate in at least two
ways: neither the term “intellectual property” nor its abbreviation appears in the Clause itself,
and the term encompasses trademark law, which is outside the Clause’s scope. Dotan Oliar,
Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on
Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1773 n.1 (2006); Edward C.
Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19
HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 81 (1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 131–38.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
4. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
5. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur . . . .”).
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reach beyond the scope of the power conferred by the IP Clause to
“secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
6
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The evidence
marshaled by this Article shows that if Congress seeks, via legislation,
to promote the progress of science and useful arts, the only way it
may do so is by enacting laws that secure to authors and inventors
exclusive rights in their writings and discoveries for limited times.
The IP Clause’s text and placement within the constitutional
structure suggest that Congress possesses power to pursue the goal of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts, but only by using
the means specified by the Clause itself: namely, securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries. Additionally, the IP Clause’s history
indicates that Congress cannot use other means to promote the
specified end of promoting the progress of science and useful arts. For
one thing, the Framers rejected other possible means of achieving this
7
end, such as the ability to award grants and prizes. This choice
implies that the Framers intended for Congress to use only the means
explicitly identified in the Clause to achieve the Clause’s ends.
Congress’s refusal in its earliest years to enact certain laws that would
have sought to promote the progress of science and useful arts
through means other than those laid out in the IP Clause—even
means allotted to Congress by other constitutional provisions, such as
8
the Commerce Clause—further confirms this understanding.
Although the Supreme Court has never directly confronted the
limitations that the IP Clause might impose on Congress’s other
powers, its jurisprudence on the IP Clause, as well as its general
understanding of clashes between two constitutional provisions,
9
supports this interpretation. Finally, the policy embedded in the IP
Clause of maintaining a careful balance between intellectual-property
rights for creators on the one hand and the broader public benefit on
the other demands that Congress not upset this balance by resorting
10
to its other powers to further the IP Clause’s ends.

6. I explore the implications of this Article’s analysis for preemption of state laws in
Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012).
7. See infra Part I.B.1.
8. See infra Part I.B.2.
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. See infra Part I.D.
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In all, the evidence to which courts and scholars normally turn to
interpret and construe the Constitution suggests that the IP Clause
externally limits Congress from using its other powers to promote the
progress of science and useful arts in ways that go beyond the IP
Clause’s means.
That said, there is a competing side to the story of Congress’s
power in this area. Congress can sometimes have legitimate interests
in enacting laws that promote the progress of science and useful arts
that extend beyond the IP Clause’s means. For one thing, the
Commerce Clause’s reach has grown greatly since the United States’
11
early years. The Commerce Clause can reasonably be understood to
extend to intellectual goods traditionally governed by the IP Clause
because of those goods’ use in commerce. Alternatively, globalization
has led to the escalating use of treaties and other foreign agreements
to govern intellectual property. Congress might view commerce or
trade interests or foreign-relations concerns as distinct from the
concerns of the IP Clause and thus as requiring the employment of
means other than those specified in the IP Clause. Any theory of the
extent of Congress’s power to regulate in the area of intellectual
property ought to address the fact that Congress might not be
concerned merely with promoting the progress of science and useful
arts, but also, for example, with promoting commerce or foreign
relations.
These competing considerations give rise to an analytical
framework under which courts, legislators, and others can assess the
constitutionality of federal legislation. As a general matter, when
legislation has the structural purpose of promoting the progress of
science and useful arts, it must restrict itself to the means specified in
the IP Clause. But with respect to laws that have multiple
constitutional purposes, there ought to be a presumption against the
constitutionality of laws that promote the IP Clause’s ends but
subvert its means, a presumption that may be overcome only by clear
and convincing evidence that Congress, pursuant to its other more
permissive powers, intentionally chose to supersede the IP Clause’s
means because of paramount, legitimate interests. This presumption
ought to be significantly harder to overcome when a law’s chosen
means interfere with the IP Clause’s means instead of merely
diverging from the means included in the IP Clause. This framework
suggests that a number of modern federal laws, such as the trade11. See infra text accompanying notes 233–36.
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secrecy laws and antibootlegging laws, might be unconstitutional. The
framework also demonstrates how to assess the constitutionality of
laws that would protect databases, laws passed pursuant to
international agreements, and laws that establish federal funding for
scientific and artistic works. Because Congress, since the late
twentieth century, has increasingly been legislating at or beyond this
constitutional boundary, having a framework with which to assess the
constitutionality of certain laws at the outer margins is increasingly
important.
This Article’s proposed framework is different from analyses set
out by previous works. Professor Thomas Nachbar, for instance,
12
maintains that the IP Clause does not limit Congress’s other powers.
I disagree.
Other scholars focus on the internal limitations of the IP Clause.
For example, Professor Lawrence Solum maintains that the Clause is
characterized by a unique means-end structure that constrains the
13
granted power. Professor Dotan Oliar similarly argues that
restrictions inhere in the IP Clause—specifically, that the IP Clause
allows Congress to enact intellectual-property laws only if they
promote the progress of science and useful arts—but does not push
further to understand how the IP Clause’s boundaries might or might
14
not limit Congress’s other powers. Given the expansiveness of

12. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 272 (2004) (“The Intellectual Property Clause and its limits do not represent generally
applicable constitutional norms and Congress may therefore legislate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause without regard to the Intellectual Property Clause or its limits.”); cf. Edward
C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective
(pt. 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 763 (2001) [hereinafter Walterscheid, IP Clause]
(arguing that the IP Clause “provides a broader scope of authority to Congress than merely the
power to create patents and copyrights, while at the same time [containing] limitations on the
patent and copyright power that are only in recent years coming to be understood”); Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a
Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1 (2002) [hereinafter Walterscheid, To Promote] (maintaining
that the IP Clause’s “‘by securing’ language is intended as an explanation of the generic grant of
power set forth in the ‘to promote’ language as specifically including authority regarding patents
and copyrights,” but that “there are both express and inherent limitations in the Clause taken as
a whole which qualify and limit the patent and copyright power of Congress[,] . . . . [and that i]n
particular, the introductory language ‘to promote’ restrains such power”).
13. Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power To Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002).
14. See Oliar, supra note 1, at 1822, 1824–45 (focusing on the policy implications of
understanding the first half of the IP Clause as limiting Congress’s authority to enact laws that
in actuality promote the progress of science and useful arts, and considering how courts might
enforce that restriction); see also Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New
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Congress’s other powers, such as the powers conveyed by the
Commerce and Spending Clauses, this question is even more critical
than the question of the IP Clause’s internal meaning alone.
Some works propose that the IP Clause restrains Congress’s
other powers. These works, however, tend to be undertheorized, do
not extend as far as my analysis does, or suggest a complex analysis.
The recurring suggestion that the IP Clause’s specific power limits
more general powers elsewhere in the Constitution is
15
undertheorized. In an in-depth analysis, Professor Yochai Benkler
extrapolates from some Supreme Court decisions and builds on policy
to read the IP Clause’s grant of power as limiting Congress to
granting exclusive rights in information only when that information
makes an “original contribution[] to the wealth of human knowledge”
16
not already in the public domain. Similarly, former Professor
William Patry reads the IP Clause as preventing Congress from
17
undermining the public’s right to copy unoriginal material. My
analysis suggests going further in some ways and less far in others.
Professors Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry perceive a complex
constellation of principles in the IP Clause that tie Congress’s hands
in enacting other legislation. In their view, the IP Clause is the only
relevant power with respect to “legislation that imposes monopolylike costs on the public through the granting of exclusive rights,” and
any law passed under it must, in exchange for granting a right to a
contribution’s creator, provide a new contribution to the public, in the

Reading, 57 UCLA L. REV. 421, 423 (2009) (characterizing his own previous work on the IP
Clause as “ma[king] one major argument”: that“[t]he Framers intended the progress language
in the Clause—‘to promote the progress of science and useful art’—to limit Congress’s power to
grant IP rights”).
15. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information Products:
Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT.
REV. 195, 230 (“Restrictions on constitutional grants of legislative power, such as the Copyright
Clause, would be meaningless if Congress could evade them simply by announcing that it was
acting under some broader authority.”); Malla Pollack, The Right To Know?: Delimiting
Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause,
and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 60 (1999) (“Accepting that
Congress may not do an end run around a limitation in one clause of the Constitution by
invoking a more general clause, Congress may not grant (at least some types of) exclusive rights
to something close to, but not quite, the writings of authors or the discoveries of inventors.”).
16. Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
535, 538–46 (2000).
17. William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An
Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 364–66 (1999).
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form of access to the work presently and free access eventually when
18
it enters the public domain.
Part I uses the IP Clause’s structure, text, history, judicial
doctrine, and policy to build the case that the Clause ought to be
understood as both a grant of limited power and a limitation on
Congress’s authority to use its other enumerated powers to promote
the progress of science and useful arts by means other than those
specified in the Clause. Part II uses this evidence to construct a
framework for assessing the constitutionality of legislation and
suggests how to evaluate the potential conflicts that might arise
between the IP Clause power and other constitutional powers, most
notably the commerce, spending, necessary-and-proper, and treaty
powers. This Part incorporates the insight that a law regulating
intellectual property might have multiple legitimate constitutional
purposes. Part III builds on this framework to suggest that a number
of existing and potential federal laws are of questionable
constitutionality.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE IP CLAUSE
Most scholars and courts that have examined the IP Clause have
dwelled on whether the first half of the Clause—“To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts”—is a restraint on Congress’s
authority to enact intellectual-property laws. That is, can Congress
enact intellectual-property laws if they do not, in actuality, promote
this progress? For example, both Justice Breyer and Professor Oliar
rely on history, constitutional structure, and policy considerations to
19
conclude that the progress provision is an independent restriction.
18. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119,
1160 (emphasis omitted).
19. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242–67 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the IP Clause limits congressional power based on the history and text of the IP
Clause and policy considerations); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE
COMMONS OF THE MIND 170, 208, 210 (2008) (arguing, after considering the constitutional text,
“Jeffersonian ideals,” and policy concerns, that the IP Clause limits congressional power);
WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 123 (2009) (“The Constitution
is quite clear that Congress can only grant copyright to promote the progress of science, and
thus this ‘burden’ exists from the inception of the rights, and follows those rights for the
duration of the copyright.”); Oliar, supra note 1, at 1772–73, 1778–79 (arguing, after considering
the Framers’ intent, that the IP Clause limits congressional power); Malla Pollack, What Is
Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 770–71
(2001) (reasoning that Congress cannot use its Commerce Clause powers to enact intellectual-
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This particular line of research focuses chiefly on the IP Clause’s
internal limits, not on its external limits—in other words, whether the
Clause limits Congress’s other powers. Such scholarship is compatible
with this Article’s analytical framework, but it ultimately falls outside
of this Article’s scope.
This Article understands the IP Clause’s first part as a purposive
channeling mechanism. That is, if Congress desires to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, it may do so only by awarding to
authors and inventors the exclusive right in their writings and
discoveries for limited times. Moreover, Congress may not use its
other enumerated powers to promote the progress of science and
useful arts by using means other than those specified in the IP Clause.
In this way, the IP Clause externally limits Congress’s other powers.
As I discuss in this Part, text, history, constitutional structure,
Supreme Court doctrine, and policy strongly support this
understanding.
Others have concluded otherwise. According to Professor
Nachbar, the Constitution does not restrain Congress from enacting
20
laws that do not conform to the IP Clause’s specified means. He
states that no good evidence—historical or otherwise—supports the
proposition that the IP Clause was intended to limit Congress’s other
21
powers, such as its powers under the far-reaching Commerce Clause.
Nachbar asserts that the IP Clause was not much debated at the
Constitutional Convention and that it is “a relatively insignificant
form of economic regulation allocating quasi-property rights between
22
private entities.” Therefore, he sees the IP Clause as being far from
23
a central structural concept in the constitutional framework.
Moreover, Nachbar detects no constitutional norms—in either the IP

property protection that does not promote the progress of science and useful arts); Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 44 IDEA
331, 333 (2004) (“[T]he preambular argument which treats the ‘to promote’ language as a
preamble which places little or no constraint on the legislative power of Congress is the most
dubious and least tenable of the various interpretations that have been given to the Science and
Useful Arts Clause.”); cf. Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment, Constitutional Purpose and
Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 470 (2003) (arguing that the Clause’s first part serves to
reject a natural-rights approach to intellectual property by emphasizing that the purpose of
intellectual-property laws is utilitarian).
20. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 276–77.
21. Id. at 277.
22. Id. at 291.
23. Id. at 291–92.
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Clause or the First Amendment—that ought to restrain Congress
from enacting intellectual-property laws beyond the IP Clause’s
limits, whereas he argues that Congress, as a matter of policy, ought
to decide the IP Clause’s boundaries vis-à-vis Congress’s other
24
powers.
Walterscheid takes a somewhat related position, although via
another analytical route. He suggests that although the IP Clause ties
Congress’s hands broadly by requiring that certain laws not impose
“monopoly-like costs on the public,” among other restrictions, it also
gives Congress power to promote the progress of science and useful
arts by various means, including but not limited to the copyright and
25
patent powers described in the Clause.
This Part disagrees by showing that the IP Clause externally
limits Congress’s other powers. The following sections in turn analyze
the Clause’s text, structure, and history, as well as Supreme Court
doctrine and policy, to make the case.
A. Text and Structure
The U.S. Constitution confers upon Congress power “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
26
respective Writings and Discoveries.” To understand the IP Clause’s
reach, one should first examine this text and its surrounding
constitutional structure. As Professor Laurence Tribe explains,
“[A]ny ‘interpretation’ of a constitutional term or provision must at
least seriously address the entire text out of which a particular
fragment has been selected for interpretation, and must at least take
27
seriously the architecture of the institutions that the text defines.”
This examination, although not conclusive, suggests a clause that
allows Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts
24. Id. at 318, 344. According to Professor Nachbar, the First Amendment limits
congressional power under the IP Clause, but it does not thereby impose external limits on
Congress’s other powers. Id. at 319–20. But see Steven J. Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of
Copyright, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶ 3 (arguing that the Copyright Clause’s limits are freespeech limits and are thus enforceable as individual rights). My approach is consistent with
either view of the First Amendment.
25. Walterscheid, To Promote, supra note 12, at 79–80; see also Walterscheid, IP Clause,
supra note 12, at 767–68.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1233 (1995) (emphasis
omitted).

FROMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE

3/19/2012 8:25 PM

1339

only by the means specified in the Clause, even if Congress might
otherwise assert another textual source of authority for its action.
Some view the first part of the IP Clause as nothing more than a
28
nonbinding preamble. This interpretation cannot be correct. For one
thing, it requires reading the first half both unnaturally and as a
nullity, contrary to the basic rule of construction that every word of
29
the Constitution must be given meaning. This construction also
confers a different grammatical understanding on the IP Clause than
on the other Article I, Section 8 powers. As James Monroe long ago
observed, each of the enumerated powers listed in Article I, Section 8
30
begins with a grant of power. Read correctly, the IP Clause fits this
scheme because, like all of the other enumerated powers, the first
part of the Clause begins with a “To,” followed by the power that is
31
being granted.
In another way, however, the IP Clause is structured differently
from the other Article I, Section 8 powers. It is the only clause that
32
specifies the means for carrying out the allotted power: “by securing
28. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A]
(2011) (“[T]he phrase ‘To promote the progress of science and useful arts . . .’ must be read as
largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not in limitation of
its exercise.” (omission in original) (footnotes omitted)).
29. See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 1, at 1787 (“The last justification for the limiting operation of
the Progress Clause has been to use the general interpretive presumption according to which
each and every word and phrase in the Constitution should be given meaning. Some argued that
interpreting the Progress Clause as a non-binding preambular statement of purpose would
render it meaningless and thus should be rejected.” (footnote omitted)); Solum, supra note 13,
at 22 (“Given the plain language of the Intellectual Property Clause and the structure of Article
I, Section 8, the notion that the Clause consists of a preamble followed by a power grant is
simply unsustainable.”); Hetherington, supra note 19, at 465 (“[I]t seems strange that the power
to promote progress would be mentioned at all, unless it was intended as a purposive element in
the clause.”).
30. James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal
Improvements (May 4, 1822), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 144, 163 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
31. Solum, supra note 13, at 13–20; see also Walterscheid, IP Clause, supra note 12, at 767
(“The clause is . . . treated as though the grant of power is: ‘To secure for limited times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’ . . . A
major disadvantage is that this is not literally the language of the clause, and such interpretation
renders its grammatical construction quite different than that afforded to every other
enumerated congressional power.”).
32. Solum, supra note 13, at 19–20; Walterscheid, IP Clause, supra note 12, at 774–75. The
Militia Clause has a related structure: it confers upon Congress power “To provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Professor Lawrence Solum understands this Clause to enable
Congress to execute the Union’s laws, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions by calling forth
the militia. Solum, supra note 13, at 19. Unlike the IP Clause, this Clause’s placement of means
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for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The natural reading of
this clause, given its unique structure, is that Congress has the power
to promote the progress of science and useful arts using solely the
33
specified means. The word “by,” preceded by a comma, links the
first part of the Clause to the second part, suggesting a means-end
34
relationship between the two. By comparison, consider two typically
structured clauses in Article I, Section 8, both of which lack any
description of the means by which Congress is to achieve the
identified ends: the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress power
“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
35
States, and with the Indian Tribes,” and the Postal Clause, which
gives Congress authority “To establish Post Offices and post
36
Roads.”
As the Supreme Court indicated during its constitutional
37
interpretation in Marbury v. Madison, “[a]ffirmative words are
often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those
38
affirmed.” Legal scholars have long pointed out how the
Constitution achieved exactly this effect by enumerating only certain
39
federal powers. Similar limitations arguably exist elsewhere in
Article I, Section 8, such as in the provision granting Congress power
to raise and support armies, but with no appropriation of money
before ends carries no suggestion that Congress may not use its other powers to execute the
nation’s laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. Cf. id. at 20 (“Unlike the second
Militia Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause grants the power to pursue a goal and then
qualifies that power by specifying the permissible means.”). Were the IP Clause to have the
same structure as the Militia Clause, by providing Congress power “to secure for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” it would not carry the same textual
implication—that the Clause’s goals may be promoted only through one specified avenue. See
id. (“The alternative [to the IP Clause’s structure] would be a power to employ any means that
furthered the goal, and such a power would not fit the general design of Article I, Section 8,
which lays out a scheme of limited and enumerated powers.”).
33. Solum, supra note 13, at 20.
34. Hetherington, supra note 19, at 467.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
38. Id. at 174. Professor Malla Pollack further points out that “[n]egative implication was a
common eighteenth century method of legal drafting.” Pollack, supra note 19, at 771 n.88 (citing
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 32, 83, 84 (Alexander Hamilton)).
39. E.g., 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 486–90 (1953); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 336–43 (2002).
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lasting for more than two years; in the provision giving it power to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization; and in the provision
40
granting power to make uniform bankruptcy laws. As discussed in
Section B, the historical evidence more comprehensively supports this
means-end textual reading of the IP Clause. Together, these sections
suggest that the IP Clause authorizes only the specified means to
promote the progress of science and useful arts.
Even so, might Congress use its other powers to employ different
means to promote the progress of science and useful arts? James
41
Madison—a central figure in the Constitution’s making —believed
that a congressional power ought to be enumerated in a separate
provision only if it did not fall within any of the other enumerated
42
powers. This line of thinking suggests that Congress cannot use its
other powers to regulate intellectual property, at least with regard to
the original understanding.
Relatedly, some scholars argue that the IP Clause limits some of
Congress’s other enumerated powers, most notably its Commerce
Clause power. They reason that the IP Clause grants a more specific
power than that provided by the Commerce Clause, and the more
43
specific ought to take precedence over the more general. This
reasoning, however, does not provide sufficient evidence that the IP
40. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (authorizing Congress “To raise and support Armies,”
provided that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress power “To establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States”); see also Patry, supra note 17, at 373 (“Claiming that [Clauses 4, 8, and 12] do not act as
a limitation on Congress’s power ignores their unambiguous text and repeated Supreme Court
opinions holding that Clause 8 is both a grant of power to Congress and a limitation on that
power.”).
41. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 860 (1994) (“But the man who dominated
constitutional debate in the first House of Representatives was the man who had dominated the
Constitutional Convention itself, James Madison.”).
42. Cf. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2381
(2003) (“This constrained view of the enumerated powers would, again, suggest that for
Madison, the Copyright Clause was a grant of power that Congress would not have possessed
but for that grant.”).
43. E.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 230; Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 63 (2000);
Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral Public Domain: Constitutional Limits on QuasiCopyright Legislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081, 1100–03 (2008); Pollack, supra note 15, at 60;
Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the
Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV.
661, 664 (2002).

FROMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1342

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/19/2012 8:25 PM

[Vol. 61:1329

Clause externally limits Congress’s other powers. With respect to its
interstate restriction, the Commerce Clause is a more specific power
than the IP Clause. Applying the general-versus-specific reasoning to
that fact, however, would lead to the incorrect conclusion that
Congress is prohibited from using the IP Clause to regulate purely
intrastate commerce, on the ground that such regulation would evade
the Commerce Clause’s restriction on regulating commerce that is
44
interstate, a restriction that is absent from the IP Clause.
By contrast, others considering the general issue of overlap
among Article I, Section 8 powers tend to conclude that the
enumerated powers can and do overlap. Professor Nachbar observes
that these powers currently overlap, given the broad contemporary
reach of the Commerce Clause, even if less overlap existed in earlier
times:
If one compares Section 8 as it was applied in 1789 with Section 8 as
it is applied today, any number of its provisions have become
superfluous. Certainly Congress could establish post offices and post
roads today under either the commerce or spending powers, enact
bankruptcy and naturalization statutes, fix standards for weights and
measures, and criminalize counterfeiting of U.S. currency under the
interstate commerce power, or even punish felonies on the high seas
under the foreign commerce power. There is no reason to think that
any of these powers were considered superfluous at the time, but
they have become so. The growth of the commerce power means
45
that we have to get comfortable with redundancy in Section 8.

Professor Jack Balkin similarly reasons that the enumerated powers
are listed together, perhaps redundantly, in support of a larger
principle authorizing Congress to act when the states are incompetent
46
to do so individually.
This possibility of overlap, however, does not mean that
Congress can use its other powers to reach beyond what seem to be
limitations in the IP Clause. In fact, the opposite would seem to be

44. See Nachbar, supra note 12, at 313 (“That one of the Section 8 limitations must be read
externally does not, as a matter of logic, dictate that they all must be; to so infer would lead to
impossible results. . . . [Applying this rule] would prevent federal regulation of purely intrastate
commercial conduct (such as sales or distribution) involving intellectual property because to
allow such regulation would be to ‘eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of
Congress to’ regulate commerce.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v.
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982))).
45. Id. at 350 (footnotes omitted).
46. Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010).
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true, textually and structurally. The reasoning embraced by Professor
Nachbar and Professor Balkin does not seem to imply that Congress
can inevitably do under one power what it is limited from doing under
another; rather, it implies merely that an overlap of powers is not in
itself forbidden. A careful reading of the text suggests that the IP
Clause authorizes only the specified means to promote the progress
of science and useful arts. As such, if Congress were permitted to use
another power to implement other means to promote this progress,
then the Clause’s means-end structure would be read out of the
Constitution’s restrictions. Thus, a textual case exists for reading the
Clause’s internal limitations as limiting Congress’s other powers. As
discussed in later Sections, the Supreme Court has reasoned
47
analogously in the context of Congress’s bankruptcy powers. Thus,
the possibility of two different constitutional powers both conferring
authority on Congress to take a particular action, as Professors
Nachbar and Balkin discuss, is materially distinct from a situation in
which one constitutional power seems to authorize action while the
other seems to restrict or forbid it.
Professor Nachbar nonetheless emphasizes that each of the
Article I, Section 8 powers has express limits. He elaborates:
Along with offenses against the law of nations, the tenth clause
permits Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies,” but
that power is expressly limited to felonies “committed on the high
Seas.” Does that mean that Congress cannot punish landlubbers’
felonies pursuant to its commerce power? The Commerce Clause
itself contains limitations, permitting the regulation of only foreign
commerce, Indian commerce, or commerce “among the several
48
States” . . . .

Nachbar goes on to suggest that the internal limitations on one power
ought not necessarily be construed to limit other powers without
evidence that the limitations were meant to reach beyond the power
49
itself. Nachbar reasons that limitations on a grant of one power are
all too easily converted into a general lack of power to legislate in
50
other areas. Without any clear signal to make such a conversion, he

47.
48.
3, 10).
49.
50.

See infra text accompanying notes 154–62.
Nachbar, supra note 12, at 295 (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls.
Id.
Id.
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continues, one should not export the IP Clause’s internal limitations
51
to other enumerated powers.
Professor Nachbar’s argument falls short. Unlike the various
clauses that Nachbar cites as examples to reinforce his argument, the
unique means-end structure of the IP Clause provides a textual signal
that Congress may not use its other powers to serve the goals of the
52
IP Clause. Moreover, as I elaborate in subsequent Sections, early
American history, judicial doctrine, and policy together loudly
reinforce this signal.
Some argue that notwithstanding the unique phrasal structure of
the IP Clause, which suggests limitations on Congress’s power, the
broader structure of Article I indicates otherwise. They reason that
Section 8 contains grants of congressional legislative power, whereas
53
Section 9 contains limitations. On this reasoning, Congress may
invoke any power that is granted by at least one clause in Section 8
54
and is not thereafter limited in Section 9. Thus, given that Section 9
does not limit Congress’s authority to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, Congress might use means authorized in powers
outside of the IP Clause to do so. Former Professor William Patry
rejects this argument on the basis that “the limitations in Article I,
Section 9 are not closely related to the grants of power in Section 8;
instead, they involve different issues, specialized issues that may or
55
may not relate to Section 8, or issues that are general in nature.”
Under this line of reasoning, to use Section 9 to reject the possibility
that the IP Clause limits Congress’s other powers seems
unreasonable.
In sum, ample textual and inferential evidence suggests that the
IP Clause on its own permits only its specified means to achieve its
designated end. The evidence from Article I’s broader structure,
however, is less conclusive. All in all, the IP Clause’s text and the
constitutional structure volunteer a suggestive—but not ironclad—
argument that the Clause’s unique construction operates externally to
forbid Congress from using its other powers to promote the progress
of science and useful arts beyond the means specified in the Clause. I

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 296, 317.
See supra text accompanying notes 32–40.
See Patry, supra note 17, at 371 (presenting, although not accepting, this argument).
Cf. id.
Id. at 373 (footnotes omitted).
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turn now to historical evidence that this understanding is the correct
one.
B. History
This Section discusses the IP Clause’s adoption at the
Constitutional Convention along with early congressional activity
construing the Clause and its structural relationship to other
enumerated powers. This evidence demonstrates that the IP Clause
was intended to restrain Congress from using its other powers to
employ means other than those in the IP Clause to promote the
progress of science and useful arts.
1. Constitutional Convention. During the period in which the
states lived under the Articles of Confederation, the infeasibility of
states’ varying intellectual-property laws became increasingly clear.
Three primary reasons contributed to this reality: First, different
states would assign rights in the same or similar creations to different
creators, or they would assign rights to the same person for the same
56
creation for differing terms. Most famously, the steamboat patent
was assigned in some states to John Fitch and in others to James
57
Rumsey. These inconsistencies were both inefficient and confusing.
Second, the protection of a creation in a single state was ineffective at
58
preventing unauthorized copies of the creation in other states.
Finally, for the same creator to apply in each state to secure effective
59
nationwide protection was uneconomical. James Madison voiced
concern about the lack of uniformity in copyright laws just before the
60
Constitutional Convention.
Thus, one should not be surprised that proposals giving the
federal government power to create intellectual-property laws arose
at the Convention. Eight such proposals were presented on August
18, 1787, almost three months into the Convention, after the
Committee of Detail had already written a first draft of the

56. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 95–100
(1967).
57. Id. at 95–98.
58. See id. at 90 (“A single state patent could not hinder imitation in other states, of course,
except in those cases where an offending device or its products entered the territory of the state
granting the patent.”).
59. Id. at 88.
60. Id. at 125.
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Constitution. James Madison made four proposals: First, in the
realm of patents, Madison suggested a provision allowing Congress
“To secure to the inventors of useful machines and implements the
benefits thereof for a limited time.” Second, as to copyrights, he
advocated language that would empower Congress “To secure to
literary authors their copyrights for a limited time.” Third, in the area
of education, he proposed a clause allowing Congress “To establish
an University.” And fourth, he imagined a clause authorizing the
creation of a system of grants and prizes under which Congress would
be permitted “To encourage, by proper præmiums and provisions, the
62
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.” Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina proposed four similar provisions that
would have allowed Congress to act in the same areas envisioned by
Madison. Pinckney’s suggested language would have authorized
Congress “To grant patents for useful inventions”; “To secure to
Authors exclusive rights for a . . . certain time”; “To establish
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences”;
and “To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the
63
promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and manufactures.” Not
only were these similar proposals by Madison and Pinckney made on
64
the same day, suggesting some coordination, but in each case, the
four proposals were also made together, signifying a similarity of
subject matter.
Madison’s and Pinckney’s proposals were referred to the
Committee of Detail, and by the end of August, they had been passed
65
on to the third Committee of Eleven. On September 5, 1787, the
third Committee of Eleven recommended—without any recorded
debate—the inclusion of an IP Clause in the Constitution that would
provide Congress with power “To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
61. Oliar, supra note 1, at 1788–89.
62. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 554–55 (1900); see also 1 id. at 130–31. Although some scholars doubt that Madison
proposed a patent power, Professor Dotan Oliar provides evidence that he did. Oliar, supra
note 14, at 435–46 (“[T]he most reasonable inference . . . is that Madison proposed that
Congress should have a patent power.”).
63. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 62, at 554–56; see also
1 id. at 130–31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. 3 id. at 554–55.
65. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 473 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
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66

Discoveries.” On September 14, 1787, Madison and Pinckney
together made a final attempt at the inclusion of a congressional
67
power to establish a university, apparently having given up on grants
68
and prizes. After rejecting this motion, the Convention approved the
69
IP Clause on September 17, 1787, again without recorded debate.
The negligible discussion of the IP Clause in the Federalist Papers
70
sheds little further light on the Clause.
Despite the near-silent treatment given to the IP Clause in the
71
Convention’s records, in reworking the eight proposals into their
final form, the Framers made a number of choices that strongly
suggest the IP Clause’s intended meaning. For one thing, the IP
Clause, as ultimately adopted, is more limited than plenary copyright
72
and patent powers would have been. Rather than granting a blanket
power to Congress to enact copyright and patent laws, as Madison
and Pinckney had each originally proposed, the Framers prefaced the
Clause’s operative provision with “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by.” The inclusion of such prefatory
language indicates that the Framers meant for the Clause to achieve
something other than merely granting to Congress power to enact
copyright and patent laws. As Section A’s textual and structural
reading of the text argues, the IP Clause’s preface seems to be a
73
limitation. Similarly, had the Clause simply given the power “to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” Congress
presumably would have had the power to enact legislation
encompassing all eight of Madison’s and Pinckney’s proposals and
74
then some. The actual text and structure emphasize that the IP
66. Id. at 505.
67. Id. at 616.
68. Id.
69. BUGBEE, supra note 56, at 129.
70. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271–72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(addressing the common-law status of works of authorship and inventions and the utility of
granting the federal government—rather than the states—the power to enact copyright and
patent laws).
71. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2375–76 (“The most relevant historical
evidence directly bearing on the original understanding of the Copyright Clause can be
summarized rapidly. There is little evidence from the Constitutional Convention.”).
72. Walterscheid, To Promote, supra note 12, at 80.
73. See Oliar, supra note 1, at 1776–77 (providing “three indications that the Framers
intended the Progress Clause as a limitation on Congress’s intellectual property power”).
74. See id. at 1777 (“The Framers . . . . took the limiting language from the rejected
proposals and tacked it onto Madison and Pinckney’s plenary intellectual property proposals
before allowing them into the Constitution.”).
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Clause is more limited than it would have been if it had consisted of
either the prefatory language or the operative language by itself.
Congress is granted authority to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, but only in a limited sense: by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors exclusive rights in their writings and
75
discoveries.
Moreover, the first part of the IP Clause, which concerns
promoting progress, is derived from Madison’s and Pinckney’s other
proposals related to intellectual property—namely, those to allow
Congress to establish universities and to provide grants or prizes for
76
innovation. The Constitution’s final version did not expressly adopt
77
these proposals. Professor Oliar primarily uses this observation to
conclude that the IP Clause ought to be understood as granting
Congress power to enact copyright and patent laws only if those laws
78
promote the progress of science and useful arts. But the more
straightforward understanding strongly suggests the converse, a
79
possibility that Oliar secondarily recognizes: if Congress wants to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, it can do so only by
securing to authors and inventors exclusive rights in their writings and
discoveries for limited times. The Framers rejected multiple other
ways to promote the progress of science and useful arts—via
universities or governmental grants and prizes, for example—yet kept
the language about promoting progress that had originally been
associated with those proposals. The Framers therefore appear to
have sought to limit the ways in which Congress can promote the
progress of science and useful arts—and in particular, to limit
80
Congress to the means specified in the IP Clause itself.
Exactly why the rejected proposals were cast aside was the
subject of only minimal discussion. Roger Sherman of Connecticut
explained that there was no need to give the university power to the
federal government, as the states could sufficiently establish
81
universities instead. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania observed
that despite the elimination of this university power, the federal

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See supra Part I.A.
Oliar, supra note 1, at 1777.
Id. at 1776–77.
Id. at 1777, 1811.
Id. at 1817.
Id. at 1791–92.
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 65, at 362.
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government would nonetheless have a limited ability to create a
university at the federal seat of government, an area over which the
82
government would have exclusive control. As for the rejected power
to award grants and prizes, some contemporaneous evidence suggests
that the Constitution did not include this power because it would
have been more expensive for a cash-poor federal government to
implement than a system of awarding copyrights and patents would
83
have been. This reason appears to have been grounded in a rejection
on the merits rather than a judgment that the federal government
would otherwise fully possess this power under alternative
84
provisions.
Scholars offer conflicting accounts of the Framers’ views on
monopolies and of how those views ought to shade a modern
audience’s understanding of the IP Clause. To the extent that the
Framers were concerned about monopolies, one might see even more
reason to conclude that the IP Clause’s carefully calibrated means of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts ought to be the only
means of doing so, for fear that pursuing alternative legislative
strategies might lead too far toward monopolization. Some
commentators emphasize that the Framers—prominently George
Mason—and Thomas Jefferson feared monopolies and sought to
approve of monopolies only narrowly by granting limited rights in

82. 2 id. at 616.
83. Walterscheid, To Promote, supra note 12, at 6 n.21. Scholars offer other theories for
this decision, such as a desire to limit monopolistic tendencies, a fear of Congress’s favoritism
toward particular individuals or states, and a desire to minimize the government’s role in the
marketplace. E.g., Oliar, supra note 1, at 1800–02.
84. The means authorized by the IP Clause indicate how Article I, Section 8 more broadly
focuses on solving problems of collective action among the states by placing power in those
areas in the hands of Congress. See generally Balkin, supra note 46 (discussing this theory with
regard to Article I, Section 8 generally); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action
Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) (same). Many
collective-action problems were associated with the preconstitutional implementation of
copyright and patent laws by states. See supra text accompanying notes 56–60. By giving
Congress power to enact copyright and patent laws, the Constitution mitigated these problems.
Relatedly, this theory of collective action explains the intellectual-property powers that the
Framers rejected: education and grants and prizes. Neither of these powers would have
implicated any significant collective-action concerns, as the states could have implemented both
of the contemplated schemes without encountering any unusually worrisome negative
externalities. This insight does not mean that Congress’s powers extend only to problems of
collective action or to every problem of collective action, but rather that the Framers were
convinced that some such problems had to be fixed by Congress.
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85

intellectual property. In support of their views, these scholars point
to earlier English copyright and patent laws enacted to curb
86
monopolies.
Others suggest that the Framers had inconsistent and complex
87
views on monopolies. For one thing, the Framers did not include a
constitutional provision that would have forbidden monopolies
88
altogether. For another, George Mason and others with asserted
antimonopoly views were, according to Professors Paul Schwartz and
Dean William Treanor, “concerned with what they feared would be a
broad implied congressional power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, rather than the express power to authorize patents and
89
copyrights.” Some Framers may have even thought monopolies were
90
good in various circumstances. This group of scholars thus suggests
that antimonopolistic concerns ought not to be relied upon in
91
construing the IP Clause. They deemphasize the importance of
Thomas Jefferson’s views in this context, not least because he did not
92
participate in the Constitutional Convention.
As Professor Nachbar points out, even the antimonopolistic
views of some of the Framers would not, on their own, establish that
the IP Clause was meant to place affirmative limits on other federal
powers. Nachbar comments that “those who would apply the
Intellectual Property Clause’s limits to all of Article I must identify a
85. E.g., BOYLE, supra note 19, at 20–28, 170; Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1143–60;
Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause,
84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 925–28 (2002); Walterscheid, IP Clause, supra note
12, at 769–70.
86. E.g., Ochoa & Rose, supra note 85, at 912–16.
87. See, e.g., Nachbar, supra note 12, at 329–45 (arguing that James Madison disfavored
monopolies but did not consider them to be enough of a problem to justify a restriction on
representative government); Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2334 (arguing that the
Founders were not uniformly “deeply fearful of . . . monopolies” and pointing to a “range of
views among the Founders about monopolies”).
88. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 329–45.
89. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2378.
90. See, e.g., id. at 2383–84 (“The Federalists, in general, believed monopolies could
advance the commonweal.”).
91. See, e.g., Nachbar, supra note 12, at 349 (“[T]he granting of monopolies was not
deemed to be a power different enough in kind or degree from other powers to be worthy of
limits beyond those inherent in representative government.”).
92. E.g., Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2378. Jefferson did, however, see a draft of
the Constitution that contained the IP Clause, sent to him by Madison. Walterscheid, IP Clause,
supra note 12, at 769. Jefferson did not mention the IP Clause when he responded to Madison,
but he urged the inclusion of a bill of rights, among whose provisions would be certain
restrictions on monopolies. Id.
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link between that general distaste and the need to constrain
government from having the power, a link never made by the
93
Framers.” At most, then, the existence of antimonopolistic views
among the Framers provides mere shading to supplement the other
historical evidence on the IP Clause.
The Framers’ views on monopolies may have ambiguous
implications for various federal powers. Nonetheless, James
Madison’s writing on the topic is useful for shedding light on the
reach of the IP Clause:
Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful ought to be granted with
caution, and guarded with strictness ag[ain]st abuse. The
Constitution of the U.S. has limited them to two cases, the authors
of Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are
considered as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the
community as a purchase of property which the owner might
otherwise with[h]old from public use. There can be no just objection
to a temporary monopoly in these cases: but it ought to be
temporary, because under that limitation a sufficient recompence
94
and encouragement may be given.

Madison’s discussion provides evidence that whatever the Framers’
overall views on monopolies, Madison himself thought that Congress
would be unable to grant monopolistic rights in intellectual property
other than via the means provided in the IP Clause. Although
Professor Nachbar agrees that this interpretation is facially plausible,
he writes that a viable alternative account would be that Madison
thought that no other enumerated power gave Congress the power to
95
grant exclusive rights. But as discussed in the next Section, a more
complete look at Madison’s views demonstrates overwhelmingly that
Madison thought the only way for Congress to grant exclusive rights
would be through the means provided in the IP Clause. To cite one
pertinent example, Madison likely believed that the exclusive rights
that would be provided by a particular legislative proposal for patents
of importation were within the reach of the Commerce Clause but
96
were otherwise restricted by the IP Clause. Therefore, the possibility

93. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 345 (emphasis omitted).
94. James Madison, Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments.,
reprinted in Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 551 (Elizabeth Fleet
ed., 1946).
95. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 346–47, 349.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 99–109.
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that Madison did not see exclusive rights of any kind as falling within
any of Congress’s other powers is unlikely.
All in all, the history that culminated in the IP Clause’s adoption
suggests that the Clause ought to be understood as granting Congress
power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, but only by
employing copyright and patent protection as limited by the Clause’s
specified means. The Framers rejected other possible means of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts, and their rejection
seems to have been a judgment on the merits that those means would
be unwise. Moreover, the Clause ultimately retained purposive, endsoriented language similar to that contained in the rejected powers—
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The inclusion
of such language underscores that the IP Clause’s ends should not be
effectuated by means other than the adopted ones.
This discussion would seem strongly to establish the IP Clause’s
internal limits, but what of the ability of Congress to invoke its other
powers to use alternative means, including the rejected means? The
same history seems strongly to support the inference that the Framers
intended Congress to possess no means to promote the progress of
science and useful arts other than those adopted in the IP Clause.
And even stronger evidence, taken from the earliest congressional
activity, encourages the drawing of this inference. I turn now to that
evidence.
2. Early Congressional Activity.
Evidence from the
Constitutional Convention is not the only history helpful for
understanding the IP Clause. As the Supreme Court emphasized in
construing the Clause in a 2003 decision, constitutional construction
can be aided by looking to “a contemporaneous legislative exposition
of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and
framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public
97
affairs.” Early congressional activity can thus shed light on how the
Framers understood the IP Clause itself and its connection with the
98
other congressional powers. This evidence demonstrates that the
Framers understood the IP Clause to operate externally to forbid

97. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 (2003) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 175 (1926)).
98. See Currie, supra note 41, at 777 (noting that “the first Congress was a sort of
continuing constitutional convention,” in part “because so many of its members . . . had helped
to compose or to ratify the Constitution itself”).

FROMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE

3/19/2012 8:25 PM

1353

Congress from using its other powers to employ means of promoting
the progress of science and useful arts not specified in the IP Clause.
A critical piece of evidence supporting the IP Clause’s external
limitations concerns patents of importation, exclusive rights for
limited times to the first person to import foreign technologies not
previously known or in use in the United States. Although a draft of
99
the Patent Act of 1790 provided for patents of importation, the final
version of the law that Congress passed during its first session did not
100
authorize them. The provision was removed on March 5, 1790, after
101
debate in the House of Representatives. Representative Thomas
Fitzsimons explained that it had been removed because of “the
102
Constitutional power being Questionable.” Correspondence reveals
that James Madison—and possibly others—doubted the
constitutionality of patents of importation. Tench Coxe, the assistant
secretary of the treasury and a strong supporter of patents of
importation as a means of encouraging American manufactures,
wrote in a letter a few weeks later to Madison:
I saw with regret the truth of [Madison’s] apprehension, that the
benefit of a patent could not be constitutionally extended to
imported objects—nor indeed, if it were within the verge of the
powers of Congress, do I think any clause to that effect could be
safely modified. Private acts would be wise and safe, if they could be
thought constitutional; but I think they cannot without an
Amendment, by striking out all of the clause that follows the word
“by” in the 8th parag. of the 8th Sec. of the first Article—or
103
something to that purpose.

Coxe’s letter makes evident that Madison did not believe that
Congress could constitutionally provide for patents of importation
because these patents seemed to lie outside of the means specified in
the IP Clause, which allows patent rights to be conferred on

99. H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 6 (1790), reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1626, 1631 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
100. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
101. Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 873–74 (1998) (citing Letter from Thomas Fitzsimons to Tench
Coxe (Mar. 5, 1790)).
102. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Fitzsimons to Tench Coxe, supra note 101).
103. Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (Mar. 21, 1790), reprinted in 13 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 111, 113 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds.,
1981) (footnote omitted).
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inventors, not on importers of already-created inventions. For this
reason, Coxe specified that the only constitutional way to legislate
patents of importation would be to remove the means limitation
specified in the IP Clause, thereby allowing the promotion of the
progress of science and useful arts by any means, including through
104
105
patents of importation. A subsequent draft of what became the
106
1791 Report on the Subject of Manufactures by Alexander Hamilton
also expressed doubt over the constitutionality of patents of
107
importation.
This evidence has consequences for both the IP Clause’s scope
and its relationship to the other enumerated powers. As to the
former, James Madison and others fairly clearly believed that
Congress could not rely on the IP Clause to implement any means of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts beyond the means
specified in the Clause. Patents of importation represented one
example of such impermissible means.
What has gone unobserved, however, is that this evidence also
shows that Madison—and apparently others in the First Congress—
believed that Congress could not invoke any of its other enumerated
powers to enact means of promoting the progress of science and
useful arts. But for the IP Clause, Congress would likely have had the
authority to provide for patents of importation pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. Even under the more limited understanding of the
108
Commerce Clause at that early juncture in American history, the
foreign-commerce powers would have authorized provisions for
patents of importation, as those kinds of provisions would have
regulated items of trade being imported from foreign countries into

104. Id.
105. Alexander Hamilton, First Draft of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures (1790),
reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 23 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1966).
106. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures
(1791), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 230.
107. Hamilton, supra note 105, at 37; see also Walterscheid, supra note 101, at 865–66
(discussing the development of Hamilton’s thoughts regarding patents of importation).
108. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15–16 (2005) (“For the first century of our history,
the primary use of the [Commerce] Clause was to preclude the kind of discriminatory state
legislation that had once been permissible.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the
Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1987) (arguing that Alexander Hamilton’s
understanding of the word “commerce” was “restrictive by modern standards”). But see Balkin,
supra note 46, at 5 (arguing that the commerce power was understood broadly during the
eighteenth century).
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the United States. That Madison and likely others thought that
Congress could not establish patents of importation under the
Commerce Clause strongly indicates that they thought that the IP
Clause externally limited Congress’s ability to promote the progress
of science and useful arts by any means other than those laid out in
the IP Clause itself.
The same conclusion can be drawn from Madison’s views on
granting land to encourage the importation of inventions. In his series
of letters with Coxe following the excision of the provision concerning
patents of importation from what became the first federal patent law,
Coxe advocated that Congress “appropriat[e] a district of territory to
the encouragement of imported inventions” if patents of importation
110
could not directly be allowed. Madison replied with skepticism as to
the constitutionality of such land grants. He stated explicitly that
Congress’s powers of encouraging invention are limited to the means
specified in the IP Clause, thus excluding the possibility of land
grants:
I can not but apprehend . . . that the clause in the constitution which
forbids patents for [importation] will lie equally in the way of your
expedient. Congress seem[s] to be tied down to the single mode of
encouraging inventions by granting the exclusive benefit of them for
a limited time, and therefore to have no more power to give a
further encouragement out of a fund of land than a fund of money.
This fetter on the National Legislature tho’ an unfortunate one, was
a deliberate one. The Latitude of authority now wished for was
111
strongly urged and expressly rejected.

109. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At
the time the original Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
189–90, 196–97 (1824) (finding that “commerce” includes “the commercial intercourse between
nations”); Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 962 (2010)
(arguing that Congress’s foreign-commerce power is robust because historically there has been
an “overriding concern that the federal government speak with one voice when regulating
foreign commerce”); Epstein, supra note 108, at 1394–95 (discussing the importance and
purpose of the foreign-commerce power). The Supreme Court has noted that “[a]lthough the
Constitution, [Article I, Section 8, Clause 3], grants Congress power to regulate commerce ‘with
foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the
Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.” Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
110. Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (Mar. 28, 1790), reprinted in 13 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 103, at 128, 128.
111. Id. Madison later stated in his first presidential inaugural address that he would use
“authorized means” to promote technological progress, implying that some means of promoting
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As much as this letter emphasizes Madison’s view that the IP Clause
permits Congress only its specified means to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, it also indicates that Congress cannot use
means otherwise within its enumerated powers to promote the
progress of science and useful arts. Madison doubted Congress’s
power to grant federal land in exchange for importing technologies
from other countries, despite the existence of the constitutional
power granted to Congress in Article IV, Section 3 “to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
112
other Property belonging to the United States.”
Further evidence buttresses this understanding of the IP Clause’s
external limitation of Congress’s other powers. In his first annual
message to Congress in 1790, President Washington invoked the goal
of “promot[ing] . . . science and literature” and asked the first
113
Congress to create a national university. Congress subsequently
debated the issue. Prominent among the arguments made against a
national university was that Congress had no power to create one.
Roger Sherman noted that the Constitutional Convention had
rejected giving Congress the power to create a university, thereby
114
leaving this power to the states instead. Similarly, Representative
Michael Stone of Maryland and others stated that the Constitution
115
did not authorize Congress to create a university. These positions

progress are unavailable to the federal government. James Madison, First Inaugural Address
(Mar. 4, 1809), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 47, 49 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Notably, many years later, in 1862, Congress employed
this power in the Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862), to give states federal land to establish
colleges and universities, id. Some argued against the law’s passage based on the IP Clause’s
external limitations. John H. Florer, Major Issues in the Congressional Debate of the Morrill Act
of 1862, 8 HIST. EDUC. Q. 459, 463–65 (1968). In addition to occurring much later in the nation’s
history, this action was arguably consistent with Congress’s earlier rejection of the university
power: it was undertaken to provide states with land so that they might exercise their
constitutionally acceptable authority to create universities.
113. George Washington, First Annual Address (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in 1 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 30, at 65, 66.
114. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1551 (1790).
115. Id.; Gazette of the United States (May 5, 1790), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 1220, 1221. In 1821, Congress
created the Columbian College in the District of Columbia, The Columbian College: Where It
All Began, GEO. WASH. UNIV., http://columbian.gwu.edu/aboutus/history (last visited Mar. 19,
2012), pursuant to its power “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the
acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States,” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 17. With regard to Washington, D.C., the seat of the U.S. government, Congress’s
powers resemble the powers reserved to the states and include those otherwise forbidden to
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support the premise that the Constitutional Convention’s rejection of
a university power as a means of promoting the progress of science
and useful arts precluded Congress from fulfilling President
Washington’s request.
Similar is the earliest Congress’s view as to whether the federal
government could fund artistic, scientific, and technological work, a
means not specified in the IP Clause. In 1789, a man named John
Churchman asked the House of Representatives to support his
invention for determining longitude based on the magnetic variation
at places of known latitude. Churchman asked Congress to help him
in two ways: first, by awarding him exclusive rights in the invention;
and second, by funding a voyage to Baffin Bay to help him further
116
develop the invention. A congressional committee debated this
request, readily concluding that Churchman ought to receive an
exclusive right for a limited term in exchange for publishing his
117
invention.
Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina,
however, questioned whether the IP Clause would allow the
legislature “to go further in rewarding the inventors of useful
machines, or discoveries in sciences, than merely to secure to them
118
for a time the right of making, publishing and vending them.”
Similarly, Roger Sherman expressed doubt that Congress could
comply with Churchman’s request for funding:
[Our grant of an exclusive right to him] appears gone as far as
proper to go at this time, as far as warranted by the
Constitution. . . . If have a right to go further and lay out money it
must be upon—Gentleman has fruitful invention. Large sums might
be expended which finally might be to no advantage. The committee
thought fit to go as far as this to promote the progress; they did not
think proper to give any further power to encourage this useful
119
discovery.

Congress. Therefore, even if Congress is forbidden via the IP Clause from creating universities
pursuant to its other enumerated powers, its power to do so pursuant to its plenary power over
the District of Columbia seems to trump the IP Clause’s external limitations. Cf. Eugene
Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts: The Forgotten Precedent of SlaveTrade Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 51 (2009) (observing that “[t]he absolute nature of
congressional control [over the District of Columbia] has suggested . . . that some other
constitutional constraints do not apply”).
116. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 143 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
117. Id. at 170–71.
118. Id. at 173.
119. Lloyd’s Notes (Apr. 20, 1789), reprinted in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 206, 213.
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Other representatives questioned the power to fund as well. The
committee tabled the funding request given “the present deranged
121
state of [the federal government’s] finances.” No resolution in hand,
Churchman renewed his request for funding, and a congressional
committee ultimately rejected it in 1791 because of the constitutional
122
questions it raised, questions the committee did not want to explore.
In 1796, a congressional committee stated this concern more
pointedly: “[A]pplication to Congress for pecuniary encouragement
of important discoveries, or of useful arts, cannot be complied with, as
the Constitution of the United States appears to have limited the
123
powers of Congress to granting patents only.” Of all those who
voiced an opinion on the matter, none appears to have thought that
the means specified in the IP Clause might encompass the funding of
artistic, scientific, and technological works.
This discussion is instructive when placed alongside another
broader contemporaneous constitutional debate. At issue in that
debate was whether the Spending Clause—authorizing Congress to
“provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
124
States” —enables Congress to spend on things beyond what the
enumerated powers otherwise permit. James Madison argued that
because “the United States is a government of limited and
enumerated powers, the grant of power to tax and spend for the
general national welfare must be confined to the enumerated
125
legislative fields committed to the Congress.” Taking the opposite
position, Alexander Hamilton contended that “the clause confers a
power separate and distinct from [other enumerated powers] . . . [and
is] limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to

120. For example, Representatives Joshua Seney, John Page, and Alexander White all
questioned the government’s authority to fund the invention’s further development. Id. at 214–
15.
121. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1789). Madison later vaguely spoke in favor of
Churchman’s research efforts without discussing the funding request specifically. Lloyd’s Notes,
supra note 119, at 211–12, 217–18.
122. H. COMM., 1ST CONG., REP. (1791), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 530, 530–31.
123. H.R. DOC. NO. 4-74 (1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MISCELLANEOUS 140, 140 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Wash, D.C., Gales &
Seaton 1832); cf. Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the
Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 99–100 (1999) (discussing similar early
congressional doubts about the constitutionality of federal educational funding).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
125. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
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provide for the general welfare of the United States.” Whether the
Spending Clause allowed spending on items not included in the
enumerated powers—or in the specific context here, on items not
permitted by the IP Clause’s means—was very much a live issue at
127
the time. In the context of Churchman’s funding request, however,
the committee members thought that Congress likely lacked the
authority to fund Churchman’s scientific research despite the
Spending Clause.
In sum, the evidence from early congressional activity
overwhelmingly suggests that the Framers believed that the IP Clause
could be employed to promote the progress of science and useful arts
only by using the means specified in that Clause and that Congress
could not use its other enumerated powers to employ any other
means.
C. Judicial Doctrine
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the IP Clause’s
external limitations directly. Nonetheless, its cases construing the IP
Clause and constitutional structure generally are consistent with—
and oftentimes are supportive of—an IP Clause that externally limits
Congress’s other powers.
The Supreme Court has stated numerous times that the power
conferred on Congress by the IP Clause is specifically a power “to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” and that the means
128
to achieve that goal are specified in the latter part of the Clause.
The Supreme Court has also examined the reach of the IP Clause.
But the Court’s discussions—frequently in dicta—have usually
occurred in the context of determining the internal constraints of the
IP Clause itself, not in the context of determining whether the IP
Clause might impose affirmative limits on Congress’s other
enumerated powers. For example, in a 1989 preemption case, the
Supreme Court noted,
[T]he Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations
upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent

126. Id. at 65–66.
127. Not until 1936 did the Supreme Court definitively side with Hamilton on this issue,
albeit not in the context of intellectual property. See infra Part II.B.2
128. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346, 349 (1991); Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermkt. Equip. Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879).
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monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it “authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
129
already available.”

Similarly, the Court stated in an earlier case interpreting patent law’s
nonobviousness requirement that “[t]he [IP] clause is both a grant of
power and a limitation” and that “Congress in the exercise of the
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
130
constitutional purpose.” Whether one ought to infer from these
statements that the IP Clause limits Congress’s overall ability to
regulate intellectual property outside of the means provided in the
Clause is not entirely clear.
The IP Clause’s external limitations can be more readily inferred
131
from the Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in the Trade-Mark Cases.
In that case, the Court struck down as unconstitutional the first
federal trademark law, which Congress had enacted pursuant to the
132
IP Clause. The Court’s reasoning was muddled, but it suggested that
the decision was resolved this way because trademark protection has
nothing—at least proximately—to do with promoting the progress of
science and useful arts. The Court indicated that the IP Clause
designates the means that Congress may use—“by securing for
limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries”—to promote the progress of
133
science and useful arts. The Court observed that “[t]he ordinary
trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery” and
that a trademark should not be understood as a “writing[]” within the
134
bounds of the IP Clause. Because trademark law’s purpose is not to

129. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (quoting
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
130. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6; see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (finding that the IP Clause, “unlike most of the specific powers which Congress is
given, . . . is qualified”).
131. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
132. Id. at 93–94.
133. Id. at 93.
134. Id. The Supreme Court subsequently made a similar point in interpreting the phrase
“origin of goods” in the Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006)), the federal implementation of the trademark laws. The Court
concluded in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), that the
rights conferred by the Lanham Act belong to “the producer of the tangible goods that are
offered for sale” rather than “the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in
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promote the progress of science and useful arts but rather to support
135
fair competition and consumer protection, trademark laws are not
plausibly within the reach of the IP Clause. The Court, however, left
open the possibility that Congress might permissibly enact a
136
trademark law under the Commerce Clause instead.
This construction is consistent with—and supportive of—the
notion of an IP Clause that externally limits Congress’s other powers.
It suggests that if a law is not aimed at promoting the progress of
science and useful arts, then Congress may not enact the law pursuant
to the IP Clause and may enact the law only if it finds another
137
enumerated power as a hook.
This reasoning constructs a
channeling mechanism of sorts: laws concerned with the promotion of
the progress of science and useful arts ought to be channeled into the
purview of the IP Clause and must comply with its limiting means,
and those that are not must be channeled elsewhere, into the purview
138
of another enumerated power. In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court
was called upon to deal with the latter situation. It has not, however,
been called upon to address directly the former situation.
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the IP Clause in Eldred v.
139
Ashcroft in 2003 is also consistent with my understanding. In that
case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress’s 1998
copyright-term extension for existing works protected by copyright, a
move that had the effect of placing those existing works on equal
durational footing with new works that were also covered by the term

those goods.” Id. at 37. The Court rejected the latter, broader possible interpretation because it
would “creat[e] a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.” Id.
135. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1885, 1891 (2011) (“Trademark law came to emphasize protecting consumers from confusion to
foster fair competition and to justify a more extensive right.”).
136. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94–98 (questioning “whether trade-mark bears such a
relation to commerce in general terms as to bring it within congressional control,” yet proposing
that the Court leave the issue undecided in light of “the dictate of wisdom and judicial
propriety”).
137. Other courts construing the Trade-Mark Cases have focused on the latter part of the IP
Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Court [in
the Trademark Cases] held that a criminal trademark statute was not authorized by the
Copyright Clause because trademarks do not require originality.”).
138. That said, the Supreme Court has implied in an offhand dictum that the Commerce
Clause might be invoked, in addition to the IP Clause, to regulate intellectual property. See
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973) (“Where the need for free and unrestricted
distribution of a writing is thought to be required by the national interest, the Copyright Clause
and the Commerce Clause would allow Congress to eschew all protection.”).
139. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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extension. Relying on text, history, and precedent, the Court held
that the “limited Times” for which Congress may grant copyright
protection includes the practice of extending copyright protection for
141
already-protected works from one limited time to another.
More relevant for the purposes of this Article, however, is the
tripartite framework the Supreme Court applied to evaluate the law’s
constitutionality. First, the Court looked to the structure of the termextension law to see if there was any “cause to suspect that a purpose
to evade the ‘limited Times’ prescription [had] prompted Congress”
142
to enact it. This analytical move suggests that future analysis might
do well to look to an intellectual-property law’s structure and
motivation to evince the law’s purpose. Second, although the
Supreme Court accorded no deference to Congress in analyzing what
“limited Times” means and whether the copyright law at issue truly
did provide protection for only “limited Times,” the question of
whether the law was a proper exercise of Congress’s power under the
IP Clause was one the Supreme Court evaluated by measuring—with
substantial deference to the legislature—whether the law was “a
rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the [IP
143
Clause].” Third, the Court recognized, as it had in previous
144
decisions, that promotion of the progress of science and useful arts
is the purpose for which Congress may enact intellectual-property
legislation and that Congress may do so by using any of the means
145
outlined in the Clause.
The combination of these three analytical components supports
my understanding of the IP Clause. By invoking these components,
the Court suggested that when Congress acts via legislation to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, it must choose to do
so by the means specified in the IP Clause. The Court will uphold any
legislation that has the end of promoting the progress of science and
useful arts as long as it secures exclusive rights to authors and
inventors in their writings and discoveries for limited times. If
legislation with this purpose lacks any of these qualities—(1) securing
exclusive rights (2) to authors and inventors (3) for their writings and

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 193–94.
Id. at 199–203.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 204–05.
See supra text accompanying notes 128–30.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211–12.
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discoveries (4) for limited times—as these qualities have been defined
by the courts, then the Court will strike down the law as
unconstitutional.
This understanding refutes Justice Stevens’s claim in his Eldred
dissent that the majority was reading the IP Clause “to provide
146
essentially no limit on congressional action under the Clause.” To
the contrary, the majority indicated that when Congress seeks to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, it must act within the
Clause’s means—by providing rights only for “limited Times,” as
construed by the Court, for example. The Court’s opinion suggests a
substantial limit on congressional action, one the First Congress
willingly imposed on itself with regard to patents of importation, land
147
grants, research funding, and establishment of a national university.
It also suggests a significant restraint for modern times, one that I
explore in questioning the constitutionality of multiple federal laws.
The Supreme Court has not said much more on limitations that
the IP Clause imposes on other enumerated powers. Yet Court
opinions in other constitutional areas shed light on the structural
relationship between the IP Clause and other congressional powers, a
relationship that supports the notion of an IP Clause that imposes
external limitations on those powers.
In the landmark civil-rights case of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
148
United States, the Supreme Court upheld federal legislation banning
149
The Court
racial discrimination in public accommodations.
reasoned that the ban was a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce
power, as it was “carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and
150
substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people.” The
Court refused to accept the argument that the law should be struck
down as outside the scope of Congress’s powers merely because the
Civil War amendments had not expressly granted the power to enact
151
the law. The Court reasoned that as long as the Commerce Clause

146. Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The
majority believes these conclusions rest upon practical judgments that at most suggest the
statute is unwise, not that it is unconstitutional.”).
147. See supra Part I.B.2.
148. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
149. Id. at 261–62.
150. Id. at 250–51.
151. See id. at 261–62 (upholding the ban as a valid exercise of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause).
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could be held to grant the power, the specific authority conferred by
152
the amendments was irrelevant.
Some scholars read the Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of Atlanta
Motel as permitting Congress to legislate under one power when
another power is closed off. For example, Professor Nachbar states
that these cases suggest that Congress can use its other Article I,
Section 8 powers to legislate when the IP Clause’s limitations bar it
153
from acting under that power.
Professor Nachbar’s reading, however, is unwarranted. In Heart
of Atlanta Motel, no reason existed to support the implication that the
Civil War amendments’ failure to ban racial discrimination in public
accommodations prevented Congress from using one of its
enumerated powers to accomplish that goal. The Court perceived no
basis to infer a conflict between those amendments and Congress’s
other powers. The situation is different in the context of the IP
Clause. The history, text, and structure discussed in Sections A and B
provide strong reasons to see just such a conflict between the IP
Clause and Congress’s other enumerated powers. The analogy to
Heart of Atlanta Motel, therefore, is inapposite.
More on point is the Supreme Court’s decision about the
154
155
relationship between the Bankruptcy and Commerce Clauses in
156
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons. In that case, Congress
had provided economic benefits for the employees of a railroad
157
company that had declared bankruptcy. The Court rejected the
argument that the action had been an exercise of Congress’s
commerce power on the basis that the clause’s structural purpose is to
158
allocate resources in a bankruptcy situation. Next, the Court
examined whether the law was a valid exercise of Congress’s
bankruptcy power. The Court ruled that it was not because the law
had made bankruptcy laws nonuniform by causing the particular

152. Id. at 250–51.
153. See Nachbar, supra note 12, at 293–94 (“The Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of Atlanta at
the very least mean that when one power does not support legislation, Congress can look to
another . . . .”); id. at 296 (”[T]he operating principle[] most clearly at work in Heart of Atlanta
and the Trade-Mark Cases . . . [is] that the absence of a grant in one power-conferring provision
is not indicative of the denial of that grant under another provision.”).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
155. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
156. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
157. Id. at 461–63.
158. Id. at 465–67.
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provisions at issue to conflict with the general bankruptcy provisions’
159
priorities. The Court reasoned that Congress could not invoke the
Commerce Clause to enact nonuniform bankruptcy provisions
because “the Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an affirmative
limitation or restriction upon Congress’ power: bankruptcy laws must
160
be uniform throughout the United States.”
Although Professor Nachbar suggests that Gibbons was
incorrectly decided or should not be broadly applied to other Article
161
I, Section 8 powers, the Court’s reasoning applies even more
strongly to the IP Clause. The historical and other evidence that the
IP Clause should limit Congress’s other enumerated powers is more
robust than any evidence of the negative implications one might draw
162
from the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. As
such, the structural reasoning that the Court employed in the
bankruptcy context ought to apply even more readily to the IP Clause
to forbid Congress from evading the limited means allowed for
promoting the progress of science and useful arts by invoking another
enumerated power.
Having discussed the relevant judicial doctrine, I now turn to an
analysis of policy considerations informing the IP Clause to provide
another window into understanding the Clause’s external limitations.

159. Id. at 468–71.
160. Id. at 468. Similar is Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), which involved an
alleged clash between Congress’s power to establish a monetary system, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 5, and its power “To borrow Money on the credit of the United States,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
The Court in Perry held that “Congress can[not] use th[e first] power so as to invalidate the
terms of the obligations which the government has theretofore issued in the exercise of the
power to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” Perry, 294 U.S. at 350. It reasoned
that doing so would negate the promise inherent in the federal government’s power to borrow
money on U.S. credit. Id. at 353.
161. See Nachbar, supra note 12, at 308, 313 (reasoning that Gibbons would be “subject to
failure if broadly applied” and finding that “blindly applying Gibbons would prevent federal
regulation of purely intrastate commercial conduct . . . involving intellectual property”).
162. Cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”?: Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 370 (1992) (“Justice
Rehnquist declared: ‘If we were to hold that Congress had power to enact nonuniform
bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a
limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.’ Under this approach, one could
contend that a law protecting compiled information under the Commerce Clause would
similarly be invalidated as an attempt to elude a substantive limitation on Congress’ power to
grant copyrights.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468–69)).
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D. Policy
The dominant policy underlying the protection of intellectual
property in the United States is utilitarian and is grounded in the IP
Clause. This utilitarian policy supplements the evidence discussed in
the previous Sections to support the idea that the IP Clause externally
limits Congress’s ability to use means other than those specified in the
IP Clause to promote the progress of science and useful arts.
163
Utilitarianism is the dominant purpose of American copyright
164
and patent law. According to utilitarian theory, copyright law
provides the incentive of exclusive rights for a limited duration to
165
authors to motivate them to create culturally valuable works.
Without this incentive, the theory goes, authors might not invest the
time, energy, or money necessary to create the works because such
works might be copied cheaply and easily by free riders, thereby
166
eliminating authors’ ability to profit from their labors. Parallel
reasoning supports patent law’s protection of inventors’ exclusive
rights in their technologically or scientifically valuable inventions for
limited periods of time. The theory is that public benefits accrue by
rewarding inventors for taking two steps they likely would not
otherwise have taken: first, to invent, and possibly commercialize; and
second, to reveal information to the public about their inventions that
167
serves to stimulate further innovation.
Utilitarianism aligns with the IP Clause. Consistent with
utilitarianism, the rights conferred by copyright and patent laws are
168
designed to be limited in time and scope. The reason for providing
copyright and patent protection to creators is to encourage them to
169
produce socially valuable works, thereby maximizing social welfare.
163. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); 122
CONG. REC. 2834 (1976) (statement of Sen. John Little McClellan); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326
(1989).
164. E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597–99 (2003).
165. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197
(1996).
166. Alina Ng, The Author’s Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 453–54 (2009).
167. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547–54 (2009).
168. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 989, 997 (1997).
169. Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards,
70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 592–96 (1985).
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If the provided rights were exceedingly extensive, society would be
170
hurt and social welfare diminished. Exclusive rights in intellectual
property prevent competition in protected works, often allowing the
rights holder to charge a premium for access and ultimately limiting
171
these valuable works’ diffusion into society. Moreover, given that
knowledge is frequently cumulative, society benefits when subsequent
creators are not prevented from building on previous artistic,
172
scientific, and technological creations to generate new works.
Therefore, copyright and patent laws ensure both that the works that
they protect will fall into the public domain in due course and that
third parties will be free to use the protected works for certain
173
socially valuable purposes.
At bottom, utilitarian theories of intellectual property rest on the
premise that the benefit to society of creators’ crafting valuable works
offsets the costs to society of the incentives the law offers to those
174
creators. The power conferred on Congress by the IP Clause reflects
a desire to reach a balance between granting creators the exclusive
rights to create and disseminate publicly valuable works and
175
restricting those rights so that the public is not hurt. The Supreme
176
Court has stated as much in numerous decisions. This principle is
177
longstanding. Congress may thus act to secure intellectual-property
protection as long as it does not upset the carefully calibrated balance
178
established by the IP Clause.

170. Lemley, supra note 168, at 996–97.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 997–98.
173. Id. at 999.
174. Id. at 996–97; see also PATRY, supra note 19, at 123 (“The Constitution is quite clear
that Congress can only grant copyright to promote the progress of science, and thus this
‘burden’ exists from the inception of the rights, and follows those rights for the duration of the
copyright.”).
175. Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 527–28.
176. E.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1994); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974) (“[A]dditions to the general store of knowledge are of such
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17
years of exclusive use . . . .”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–31 (1964)
(“Patents are not given as favors . . . but are meant to encourage invention . . . .”).
177. E.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185–86 (1896).
178. See id. (“It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public
property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.”).
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In this vein, the Supreme Court has strongly indicated that the IP
Clause contemplates the existence of a public domain that cannot be
undone. For example, in the context of discussing the relationship
between federal powers under the IP Clause and state authority, the
Court has noted that
the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and
technologies into the public domain through disclosure. State law
protection for techniques and designs whose disclosure has already
been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very purpose
of the patent laws by decreasing the range of ideas available as the
building blocks of further innovation. . . . To a limited extent, the
federal patent laws must determine not only what is protected, but
179
also what is free for all to use.

The policy of maintaining a balance between public benefit and
intellectual-property rights for creators is deeply utilitarian in
promoting the progress of science and useful arts. Laws that upset this
calibrated balance by transgressing the limits set by the IP Clause—
say, by offering rights of unlimited duration or by offering rights to
someone other than the creator—are therefore particularly
troublesome. In this sense, policy interests support the idea that
Congress is disallowed from using any of its powers to promote the
progress of science and useful arts other than the power conferred by
the IP Clause itself.
That said, one might readily imagine Congress’s using means
other than those specified in the IP Clause that, as a policy matter, do
not upset the balance envisioned by the IP Clause. For example,
federal funding of scientific research or cultural works would seem, as
a policy matter, to promote the progress of science and useful arts
without undermining public utility. At the right price, the cost of such
funding would be exceeded by the public benefit, all without the
monopoly-like effects that can result from patent and copyright laws.
On the whole, then, intellectual property’s utilitarian basis—
reflected in the IP Clause—supports the Clause’s external limitations,
at least as far as Congress might use its other powers to subvert the
means set out in the IP Clause. To the extent that Congress would use
its other powers to employ means that do not affect the calibrated

179. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)
(“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”).
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balance set out in the IP Clause’s text, these same policy concerns are
not necessarily implicated.
*

*

*

This Part demonstrates that the combination of textual and
structural analysis, historical evidence, judicial doctrine, and policy
favors the existence of external limitations in the IP Clause that
operate to ban Congress from using its other enumerated powers to
promote the progress of science and useful arts via means not
authorized by the IP Clause.
Some other scholars working on this topic conclude that the IP
Clause limits Congress’s other powers, but they take different
approaches from the one advanced in this Article—approaches that
either require more complex analytical frameworks or are less
grounded in the foregoing evidence. For one, former Professor Patry
does think that the IP Clause restricts Congress’s other powers. He
reads the Supreme Court’s doctrine as holding that the IP Clause
“contains both positive and negative rights: a positive right to grant
authors a limited monopoly in their original material, and a negative
180
right in the public to copy unoriginal material.” Patry elaborates
that “these two rights are mutually exclusive: either an author has an
exclusive right over given material, or the public has a right to copy
that material. Both rights cannot be exercised at the same time with
181
respect to the same material.” As such, Patry claims that Congress
may not provide for perpetual intellectual-property protection, as
doing so would contravene the “limited Times” restriction of the IP
182
Clause. Similarly, according to Patry, databases lacking sufficient
constitutional originality to qualify for copyright protection should
not be protectable under legislation enacted pursuant to one of
183
Congress’s other powers.
Former Professor Patry’s analysis does not go far enough in light
of the evidence presented in this Part. By insisting that Congress’s
powers are restricted only with regard to unoriginal material, Patry
does not address the evidence supporting an understanding that all
means that are not specified in the IP Clause are off-limits.

180.
181.
182.
183.

Patry, supra note 17, at 362.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 376 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
Id. at 384–86.
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Like former Professor Patry, Professor Yochai Benkler proposes
that the IP Clause is “a specifically limited grant available only to
184
protect original contributions to the wealth of human knowledge”
and that Congress cannot legislate beyond those bounds, even using
185
its other powers. More specifically, Benkler suggests that
Congress may create [IP] rights if and when they are likely to
encourage information production more than they inhibit it, if it
makes them available only to those who make original contributions
to the wealth of our collective knowledge, and if the exclusive right
enacted does not remove, or burden free access to, information
186
already in the public domain.

Benkler suggests that Congress can use its other powers to “regulate
information markets” only if the laws that it creates are different in
187
kind from those authorized under the IP Clause. To derive these
188
limitations, Benkler relies on doctrinal and policy analysis, along
with what seems to be an implicit argument that the IP Clause’s
restrictions would be too easy to evade if they did not limit Congress’s
other powers. Under his framework, Benkler concludes that some
189
possible legislation protecting databases is unconstitutional.
Professors Paul Schwartz and William Treanor call Professor
Benkler’s analysis “a highly unconventional originalist linguistic
argument, which turns on the Framers’ alleged understanding of a
190
single word: ‘Progress.’” In any event, like former Professor Patry’s
position, Benkler’s analysis does not go as far as it might in light of
the myriad pieces of evidence suggesting that all means not specified
in the IP Clause are off-limits to Congress.
Professors Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry also think that the IP
Clause limits Congress’s other powers. They rely on early American
history, which they read as reflecting a widespread suspicion toward
governmental grants of exclusive rights, to suggest that “the
Intellectual Property Clause was included as both a grant of power to

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Benkler, supra note 16, at 540.
Id. at 536–40.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 551–52.
Id. at 558–74.
Id. at 575–87.
Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2340–41.
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Congress and also an absolute limitation of its power.” Based on
this reading, they identify five principles that delineate the reach of
Congress’s IP powers: the “Suspect Grant Principle,” which provides
that “the limiting language of the Clause . . . [applies] only to
legislation that imposes monopoly-like costs on the public through
192
the granting of exclusive rights”; the “Quid Pro Principle,” under
which laws enacted pursuant to the Clause must be premised on “the
author or the inventor . . . giv[ing] the public something it did not
193
have before to earn a grant of exclusive rights from Congress”; the
“Authorship Principle,” which dictates that the creator must receive
194
the grant of exclusive rights; the “Public Domain Principle,” which
specifies that the rights should last for a limited time, after which
195
point the protected work must fall into the public domain; and the
“Flexibility Principle,” which provides Congress with broad discretion
196
to decide how to wield its powers under the IP Clause. Heald and
Sherry conclude that Congress may not use its other powers, such as
the commerce or treaty powers, to enact laws that flout these
197
principles. They suggest that these principles can holistically guide
198
decisions on various laws’ constitutionality. For example, they use
their framework to suggest that the copyright-term extension that the
199
Supreme Court upheld in Eldred is unconstitutional because it
200
violates the Quid Pro Principle and the Public Domain Principle.
Although the holistic framework of Professors Heald and Sherry
shares points of commonality with the more streamlined approach I
201
take, it is too complex both to conceptualize and to apply.

191. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1160. Professor Pollack similarly reads various
limitations into the IP Clause, including that the Clause “prevents Congress from giving authors
or inventors exclusive rights unbounded by premeasured time limitations.” Malla Pollack,
Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce
Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 259, 260 (1995).
192. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1160 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. at 1162.
194. Id. at 1164.
195. Id. at 1165.
196. Id. at 1166–67.
197. Id. at 1167.
198. Id. at 1167, 1197.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 139–47.
200. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1168–74.
201. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2341–42.
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To sum up, this Part surveys considerable evidence from multiple
vantage points—text, structure, history, judicial doctrine, and
policy—that supports the IP Clause’s external limitations. This Part
thus refutes the claims of Professor Thomas Nachbar that the IP
Clause does not reach out to limit Congress’s other powers.
Moreover, it yields a framework for evaluating laws’ constitutionality,
a subject to which I now turn.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONALITY
This Part builds on Part I’s evidence of the IP Clause’s external
limitations to suggest a framework for evaluating a law’s
constitutionality. Generally, if a law has only the structural purpose of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts, it must comply with
the means described in the IP Clause. If it does not comply with those
means, it is unconstitutional. If the law lacks the structural purpose of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts, it is outside the IP
Clause’s purview and must be enacted pursuant to another of
Congress’s powers, as is the case with trademark law. If, in addition to
the structural purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful
arts, the law has another legitimate purpose pursuant to Congress’s
other powers, such as promoting trade or foreign relations, Congress
may act beyond the IP Clause’s means only if it overcomes a
presumption against the law’s constitutionality. That is, the law ought
to be deemed constitutional only if clear and convincing evidence
demonstrates that Congress intentionally chose to supersede the IP
Clause’s means because of paramount interests pursuant to its other
more permissive powers. This presumption ought to be extremely
hard to overcome when a law’s means subvert those in the IP
Clause—such as by granting perpetual copyright protection—as
compared to a law whose means merely are not contained in the IP
Clause—such as funding for scientific research.
Section A of this Part discusses how to assess whether a law’s
function is to promote the progress of science and useful arts through
the lens of structural purpose. It also addresses how to analyze laws
with multiple legitimate constitutional purposes, creating a
presumption framework for assessing constitutionality in those cases.
Section B then turns to some of the most likely sources of conflict
with the IP Clause: the commerce, spending, necessary-and-proper,
and treaty powers.
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A. Is the Law’s Function To Promote Progress?
Honoring the IP Clause’s external limitations requires an
understanding of when Congress is seeking to promote the progress
of science and useful arts to help determine whether a given law
202
should be understood to be within the IP Clause’s purview. This
Section explores how to understand the first part of the IP Clause.
Broken down, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”
generally refers to the goal of encouraging the advancement of
systematic knowledge, cultural knowledge, and technology. I then
work out how to assess whether a law has this end and thus falls
within the scope of the IP Clause, meaning that it may use only the IP
Clause’s specified means.
According to the Supreme Court, “to promote” as used in the IP
203
Clause means “‘to stimulate,’ ‘to encourage,’ or ‘to induce.’” Most
204
commentators understand “progress” to mean advancement. As
Professor Solum explains further, “progress” can be understood
either as “advancement of learning [with a] focus on the results of
scientific activity” or as “encouraging the activity itself [with a] focus
205
on the process itself.” The first understanding can further mean
improvement in a knowledge base’s quality or quantity.
Rejecting an approach like Professor Solum’s, Professor Malla
Pollack concludes on the basis of some historical linguistic evidence
206
that “progress” means spread, diffusion, or distribution. She rejects
Solum’s possible meanings in large part because under those
meanings, she argues that “to promote the progress of science and
useful arts” would have the same meaning as “to promote science and
207
useful arts.” Pollack’s objection, however, is unpersuasive. The
former phrase might straightforwardly be understood to mean that
the Framers wanted to provide Congress the power to promote—
both directly and indirectly—the movement of science and useful arts
in forward directions. This capacious ambition would not have been
communicated by the latter language. Moreover, as Solum observes,

202. Cf. Solum, supra note 13, at 3 (“[T]he Copyright Clause requires that Congress pursue
the goal of promoting the progress of science.”).
203. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
204. E.g., Solum, supra note 13, at 45; Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 93; Walterscheid,
supra note 19, at 376.
205. Solum, supra note 13, at 45–46.
206. Pollack, supra note 19, at 755–57, 794–95, 809.
207. Id. at 788–94.
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the linguistic evidence Pollack presents is consistent with his favored
understanding and in fact represents the more usual understanding of
208
the term “progress.” I thus presume that Solum’s understanding is
correct, although my framework would also work with Pollack’s
definition.
“Science” as it appears in the IP Clause did not originally have
the meaning contemporary Americans associate with it—biology,
chemistry, and the like. Instead, at the time of the Framing, science
meant knowledge or learning, particularly of the kind that is
209
systematic and of enduring value. That meaning makes particular
sense in light of the fact that one of James Madison’s four
constitutional proposals that yielded the IP Clause sought “the
210
advancement of useful knowledge.” For the most part, this goal of
advancement corresponds to what the Constitution encourages in
copyright law: the production of cultural goods and knowledge.
The term “useful arts,” confusingly enough, has nothing to do
with cultural or fine arts. Rather, at the time of the Framing, it meant
“helpful or valuable trades,” such as mechanical and civil
211
engineering. Useful arts were understood to be skills that were
212
They were principally what
practical rather than theoretical.
213
modern Americans have come to understand as technology, and
they are what patent law is intended to promote.
In sum, then, the evidence seems to show that a law is about
promoting the progress of science and useful arts if it seeks to
encourage advancement in areas of systematic knowledge, including
cultural knowledge or technology.
This understanding provides a definition to help assess whether a
law is focused on promoting the progress of science and useful arts so

208. See Solum, supra note 13, at 46–47 (“[G]iven that the common-sense interpretation of
the term ‘progress’ involves a figurative use, the prevalence of the underlying literal use only
reinforces the possibility that the term was used in the common figurative sense.”).
209. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125 & n.46 (2002); see also Solum, supra note
13, at 3 (“[Th]e meaning of science that best coheres with the constitutional text and the original
understanding can be glossed as systematic knowledge or learning of enduring value . . . .”); id.
at 51–52 (identifying the earliest federal copyright law’s reference to “encouragement of
learning” as a synonym for “promot[ing] the Progress of science” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
210. See supra text accompanying note 62.
211. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 209, at 126.
212. Id. at 128.
213. Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 819 (2010).
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as to tell whether Congress must respect the IP Clause’s external
limitations. But observers have many ways with which to measure
whether a law has this purpose, such as by gauging different
legislators’ views or by looking to legislation’s stated purposes.
Canvassing different legislators’ views is very slippery, as assigning a
214
unified purpose to a multimember body is difficult. At the other
extreme, looking conclusively to a law’s stated purpose—or, similarly,
to its stated constitutional authority—gives Congress the easy escape
valve of stating one purpose—or power—when in fact it has another
in mind. Relying too much on this measurement would permit
Congress to evade the IP Clause’s external limitations. Another
possible test would be to investigate whether a law actually has the
effect of promoting the progress of science and useful arts. Such a test
is not ideal, however, both because judging legislation’s actual effect
can be difficult at the outset and because courts might not be
215
institutionally competent to make such a determination.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has emphasized in numerous cases
that Congress should not be second-guessed on whether its laws
enacted under the IP Clause actually promote the progress of science
216
and useful arts.
Instead, I suggest that the optimal way to measure whether a law
aims to promote the progress of science and useful arts is to assess its
structural purpose. This approach is consistent with the way the
Supreme Court typically evaluates a law’s purpose to determine its
217
constitutionality, including in the context of intellectual property. In
Eldred, the Court reasoned that a helpful mode of analysis was to

214. See William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 171, 173 (2000) (“[T]he concept of a single Congress producing legislation is
undoubtedly a fiction.”).
215. Cf. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2334 (arguing for deferential review of
“congressional legislation affecting intellectual property . . . because of concerns about
institutional competence and respect for majoritarian decisionmaking”).
216. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (“It is
for Congress to determine if the present system of design and utility patents is ineffectual in
promoting the useful arts in the context of industrial design.”).
217. See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1788
(2008) (“[C]ourts . . . had long been willing to consider some objective indicia of legislative
purpose in deciding whether a statute was even superficially valid.”); see also David L. Franklin,
Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 90–91
(2006) (“[A]n understanding of constitutional meaning that includes a requirement of legitimate
legislative purpose—in short, a judicial concern with the commercial ends or aims of the
challenged statute as a whole—lies beneath the doctrinal surface [of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence].”).
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assess a law’s purpose structurally. In Gibbons, the Court assessed
the relevant law’s constitutionality by reasoning that its structural
purpose was to allocate resources in a bankruptcy situation and that it
219
must therefore comply with the Bankruptcy Clause’s limitations.
220
Starting with McCulloch v. Maryland, numerous Court decisions
also suggest that an analysis of structural purpose is essential to
221
ensure that Congress is acting within its powers.
As Professor John Manning notes, “Few would deny the
possibility of gleaning a statute’s overall purpose from its structure or
222
from the aims suggested by the text itself.” Although reasonable
minds might differ as to a law’s structural purpose, the law ultimately
passed by Congress often gives significant clues as to the purpose or
power used. For example, relevant pieces of information include the
intended effects or causes of the legislation, the stated effects or
causes, and the statute’s desired placement alongside other laws with
a similar purpose or power.
This reasoning suggests that if Congress is acting with the
structural purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful
arts, it must comply with the IP Clause’s means. If it employs other
means for that purpose, it is acting beyond its powers.
How, though, should courts analyze laws that have multiple
material purposes? For example, a law providing copyright or patent
protection to foreign creators might be aimed at promoting the
progress of science and useful arts, but it might also be aimed at
promoting interstate and foreign commerce. Or a law regulating
intellectual property pursuant to a treaty obligation of the United
States might be directed both at promoting the progress of science

218. See supra text accompanying notes 139–47.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 156–60.
220. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
221. See id. at 423 (“Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which
are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say that such an act was not the law of the land.”);
see also Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885) (“[T]he rule is general with reference to
the enactments of all legislative bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the
legislators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferrible
from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and existing
legislation.”); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884) (looking to the structural
purpose of a federal law levying a per-passenger fee on vessels from foreign ports to determine
whether the law was an exercise of Congress’s commerce power).
222. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2408 n.75 (2003).
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and useful arts and American foreign-relations interests. Congress, in
such cases, has multiple legitimate constitutional interests, and those
interests may point in competing directions. For example, foreignrelations or trade interests might suggest that a law ought to extend
beyond the IP Clause’s means, whereas intellectual-property interests
would counsel otherwise. In these cases, there are competing
considerations. On the one hand, the IP Clause, as demonstrated
herein, externally limits Congress’s other powers. On the other,
Congress can have purposes other than intellectual-property
regulation in mind in enacting a law.
To resolve these competing considerations, a presumption
framework is helpful to ensure that if Congress is evading the IP
Clause’s means, it is doing so because it feels compelled to do so due
223
to competing constitutional interests. That is, laws that have a
purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful arts ought to
be presumed unconstitutional unless clear and convincing evidence
shows that Congress considered superseding the IP Clause’s means
important due to other legitimate, material constitutional interests,
such as foreign relations or commerce. Of course, these other
interests must be legitimate and not merely asserted as a sham to
224
bypass the IP Clause’s external limitations. Otherwise, laws with
multiple purposes would easily evade the IP Clause’s limited means,
which together operate as a sensible restriction on Congress’s
225
authority.
This presumption framework would, as Professors Samuel
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes note in a different context, place “the
judicial emphasis on second-order issues of appropriate institutions
and processes, through which courts seek mainly to ensure that the
223. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Meriwether Lewis, the Air Force, and the Surge: The Problem of
Constitutional Settlement, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 649, 653 (2008) (“[O]ur Constitution must
incorporate not only the text and the judicial constructions of it, but the accommodations
reached by the political branches in the difficult task of actually administering a constitutional
democracy.”).
224. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02, 615 (2000) (striking down as an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power a federal law that provided a “civil
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence,” despite congressional findings that such
violence substantially affected interstate commerce, because Congress had “rel[ied] so heavily
on a method of reasoning that [the Court] ha[d] already rejected as unworkable”).
225. Cf. M. David Lepofsky, The Canadian Judicial Approach to Equality Rights: Freedom
Ride or Roller Coaster?, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 189 (1992) (refusing to distinguish
between laws with a particular single purpose and those with multiple purposes, “lest a
legislature be able to piggy-back legislative purposes to enable it to do that which the
Constitution forbids”).
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right institutional process supports the tradeoff between [competing
226
constitutional interests] at issue.” This process-oriented approach
would take cognizance of Congress’s better placement, as compared
to courts’, to evaluate how to trade off between multiple policy
interests when more than one constitutional authority is at stake in
227
the context of intellectual property. This presumption framework
would transform the constitutional inquiry into one of statutory
interpretation, one with which courts ought to feel more
228
comfortable.
This presumption of unconstitutionality ought to be harder to
overcome in certain circumstances than in others. In particular,
Congress might enact laws that subvert the IP Clause’s means, such as
by enacting perpetual copyright protection, granting patent rights to
someone other than the inventor, or granting protection to works that
229
are neither writings nor discoveries. Such laws would contravene
the IP Clause’s external limitations most directly, by upsetting the
calibrated balance of the IP Clause, a balance between a grant of
230
incentives to authors and inventors and a broader public benefit. In
such situations, the presumption of unconstitutionality ought to be
extremely hard to overcome. By comparison, the presumption ought
to be somewhat easier to overcome for a law whose means merely are
not contained in the IP Clause, such as funding for scientific
231
research.
In sum, then, legislation with the material structural purpose of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts must use only the

226. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 1, 44–45 (2004).
227. Cf. id. (making a parallel observation in regard to bilateral institutional actions that
trade off between liberty and security).
228. This transformation happens in many areas of the law, including extraterritoriality of
domestic laws, federal preemption of state laws, and treaty obligations. See Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (“The presumption that United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent law.”); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that there is a presumption against
federal preemption of state laws unless “that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”);
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral
commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.”).
229. Cf. infra Part III.B.
230. See supra Part I.D.
231. Cf. infra Part III.E.
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means specified in the IP Clause to effectuate that end. If such a law
uses other means, it is unconstitutional. Moreover, if a law has
multiple legitimate constitutional purposes, one of which is to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, it should be
presumed to be unconstitutional if it does not comply with the IP
Clause’s means, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
Congress has chosen to supersede those means because of overriding
interests pursuant to another legitimate constitutional power.
The means specified in the IP Clause require “securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
232
respective Writings and Discoveries.” In relevant part, then, as
elaborated in the next Section and in Part III, to comply with those
means, a law must include a grant of an exclusive right that is limited
in time to someone who qualifies as an author of something that is his
or her writing, or to someone who qualifies as an inventor of
something that is his or her invention.
B. Potential Conflicts
Before delving in the next Part into some federal laws of dubious
constitutionality in light of the IP Clause’s external limitations, I first
analyze the four constitutional powers most likely to conflict with,
and to provide cover for evading, the Clause’s external limitations:
the commerce, spending, necessary-and-proper, and treaty powers.
After setting out the nature of these possible collisions—in the simple
case of a law’s having the single purpose of promoting the progress of
science and useful arts—I return to the presumption framework. I
return to that framework to examine how extensively it might efface
the IP Clause’s external limitations in light of a nuanced
understanding of the varied constitutional interests that might be
invoked in enacting a law.
1. Commerce Clause. Although most think the Commerce
233
Clause, as originally understood, described only a narrow power, its
reach has grown to be extensive. The Commerce Clause has been
described by the Supreme Court as authorizing three broad classes of
regulation: (1) laws that “regulate the channels of interstate
commerce”; (2) laws that “regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce”; and (3) laws that “regulate activities that
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
233. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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234

substantially affect interstate commerce.” Included in this third
category are “purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class
235
of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”
Furthermore, the Court has said that “Congress can regulate purely
intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not
produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of
activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that
236
commodity.”
Although these categories might betray some
limitations on Congress’s commerce power, the power is,
nevertheless, quite extensive.
But for the IP Clause’s external limitations, most intellectualproperty legislation could likely be enacted under the cover of this
expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause. Artistic, scientific,
and technological works that are encouraged by intellectual-property
legislation can typically be linked to activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.
If a law were aimed at promoting the progress of science and
useful arts but failed to comply with the IP Clause’s means, then the
federal government would be likely to defend that law by reference to
237
the Commerce Clause. As the discussion in Part I reveals, however,
Congress is acting outside of its constitutional authority when it
attempts to use the Commerce Clause to promote the progress of
science and useful arts while not restricting itself to the IP Clause’s
means, unless Congress can show clearly and convincingly that it had
legitimate material interests under the Commerce Clause that
necessitated a transgression of the IP Clause’s limited means.
The collision between the Commerce and IP Clauses is direct.
The other three powers that might collide with the IP Clause—the
spending, necessary-and-proper, and treaty powers—to which I will
now turn, clash less obviously or directly, if at all.
2. Spending Clause. Another constitutional provision that might
conflict with the IP Clause’s external limitations is Article I’s
Spending Clause. That clause authorizes Congress to “lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for

234.
235.
236.
237.

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
For one example, see infra Part III.B.
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the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”
Early history—particularly congressional worries about funding a
239
research expedition —suggests a great potential for conflict between
the Spending and IP Clauses.
As mentioned in Part I.B, in the nation’s early history,
commentators held differing views on the Spending Clause’s reach. In
1791, Alexander Hamilton submitted to Congress his Report on the
Subject of Manufactures, in which he argued that Congress had the
authority under the Spending Clause to award “[p]ecuniary bounties”
240
to encourage American manufacturing. Hamilton’s argument was
meant to counter congressional opposition to using means beyond
those elaborated in the IP Clause to promote the progress of science
241
and useful arts. Hamilton claimed that the Spending Clause could
be used to spend for the general welfare, even if the spending was for
a purpose not otherwise enumerated in the Constitution as a
242
congressional power. Nonetheless, Hamilton thought that spending
could not be used to evade express or fairly implied limitations on
243
congressional powers. Given his proposal to fund manufacturing
endeavors, however, Hamilton apparently did not find the limitations
on the IP Clause to rise to that level. In fact, Hamilton’s expansive
view of the Spending Clause seems to have stemmed in part from his
244
constrictive understanding of the reach of the IP Clause.
Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison challenged
Hamilton’s view. They understood the Spending Clause to allow for
congressional spending that is consistent with the other enumerated
245
powers. Pursuant to this understanding, and given the IP Clause’s

238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 116–27.
240. Hamilton, supra note 106, at 298, 303–04 (“No objection ought to arise to this
construction from a supposition that it would imply a power to do whatever else should appear
to Congress conducive to the General Welfare. A power to appropriate money with this latitude
which is granted too in express terms would not carry a power to do any other thing, not
authorised in the constitution, either expressly or by fair implication.”). Hamilton appeared to
be suggesting rewards for those who had made successful inventions, rather than general
funding of scientific innovation. Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 110.
241. Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 101–03.
242. Hamilton, supra note 106, at 303–04.
243. Id.
244. See Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 108–09 (noting that Hamilton’s views were
“predicated on a narrow interpretation of the language of the intellectual property clause”).
245. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), reprinted in 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 131, 133 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907); Letter from James
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external limitations, Congress would have lacked authority to
promote the progress of science and useful arts through grants.
Jefferson and Madison’s view prevailed until the New Deal era.
246
Congress did not fund research and development in its early years.
But the Supreme Court later adopted Hamilton’s view in 1936, in
247
a case analyzing the constitutionality of processing and floor-stock
248
taxes under Congress’s Agricultural Adjustment Act. The Court in
that case held that “public funds may be appropriated ‘to provide for
249
the general welfare of the United States.’” Rejecting Jefferson and
Madison’s view, the Court stated that “the power of Congress to
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
250
Constitution,” but rather by the confines of the Spending Clause.
The Court has since indicated that “[i]ncident to [the spending]
power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds,” even for “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s
251
‘enumerated legislative fields,’” subject to several limitations. The
first of these limitations is that the “exercise of the spending power
252
must be in pursuit of the ‘general [W]elfare.’” Second, “other
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the
253
conditional grant of federal funds.” As explained by the Court, “the
power may not be used to induce [recipients] to engage in activities
254
that would themselves be unconstitutional,” nor may it be used to
prohibit “the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is
255
not empowered to achieve directly.” These ostensible caveats
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has tended to interpret the
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 18, 1800), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 111, at 347, 357.
246. See Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 113–14 (“Regardless of Washington’s views, both
Jefferson and Madison rather quickly challenged Hamilton’s broad interpretation of the
spending power under the general welfare clause, and Congress was not generally disposed to
adopt it for the purpose of either creating a national university or funding R&D . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
247. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936).
248. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), invalidated by United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
249. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.
250. Id. at 66.
251. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 65).
252. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
253. Id. at 208.
254. Id. at 210.
255. Id.
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Spending Clause expansively, ensuring that even these limitations are
256
narrowly applied.
Although Madison and Jefferson may in fact have had the more
appropriate understanding of the Spending Clause, particularly in
view of early congressional practice, the Supreme Court’s holdings
seem to foreclose the return of that view. This reality, however, does
not necessarily mean that Congress may spend to promote the
progress of science and useful arts in violation of the IP Clause’s
means. Much in the same fashion that the Commerce Clause is
constrained by the IP Clause’s limited means, a strong case can be
made that Congress cannot rely on the Spending Clause to initiate
spending to promote the progress of science and useful arts. Even
accepting that the Spending Clause is an independent power, one
might still see the IP Clause as providing an external limit on that
257
Article I power. In fact, the Supreme Court’s understanding that
other constitutional limitations can restrict the Spending Clause’s
reach could be understood to prohibit congressional spending to
promote the progress of science and useful arts using means other
than those laid out in the IP Clause. Nonetheless, given the Supreme
Court’s expansive understanding of the Spending Clause over time,
the Court might not as readily find that the IP Clause’s limitations do
in fact inhibit Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.
3. Necessary and Proper Clause. Another broad constitutional
power conferred upon Congress permits the legislature “To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
258
Department or Officer thereof.” My discussion here explores the
potential of the Necessary and Proper Clause to conflict with the IP
Clause’s external limitations.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Necessary and Proper
Clause supplements the more specific grants of power to Congress by
conferring on Congress the “broad power to enact laws that are
256. David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1197, 1198–99 (2004).
257. But see Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1174–75 (“[There exists a] clearly
constitutional method by which Congress can direct public monies to the copyright industry:
outright subsidies.”).
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial
259
exercise.’” As the Court explained in McCulloch v. Maryland,
“necessary” does not require that the action be “absolutely
260
necessary.” Rather, as McCulloch explained, “Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
261
constitution, are constitutional.” A law is proper under this Clause,
then, if it “constitutes a means that is rationally related to the
262
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”
Does this power enable Congress to legislate to promote the
progress of science and useful arts beyond the means specified in the
IP Clause? Not wholly. Rather, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
suggests that, at most, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives
Congress the power to legislate to help implement the IP Clause.
Because the IP Clause specifies the limited means by which Congress
may legislate to achieve a specified end, Congress can use the
Necessary and Proper Clause to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, but only by legislating in ways that support the means
specified in the IP Clause. The Clause does not allow Congress to use
other means more broadly to promote the progress of science and
useful arts. That is, Congress can establish a patent office to examine
patents before granting them and can require or encourage deposits
of copyrighted materials in a central repository, even though these
means are not literally within the IP Clause’s scope. What is less clear
is whether Congress can use other means further afield from the
implementation of copyright and patent laws. I return to this issue in
the next Part as I consider federal funding of artistic and scientific
works.
This analysis is consonant with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a source of
congressional power. That is, congressional exercises of power under
the Clause are not constricted by the IP Clause insofar as they seek to
help execute the means and ends of the IP Clause. Consider that in

259. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 418 (1819)) (upholding Congress’s power to commit
mentally ill sex offenders civilly after they have completed their criminal sentences).
260. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414–15.
261. Id. at 421.
262. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
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McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall indicated that the Necessary and
Proper Clause cannot be invoked by Congress to enact a law that is
forbidden by the Constitution, even if the Clause would otherwise
263
permit it. Because, as this Article argues, Congress is forbidden
from using means other than those laid out in the IP Clause to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, in certain instances
Congress may likewise be forbidden from pursuing the same goal
generally via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress may,
however, use the Necessary and Proper Clause to support the means
it employs in service of the IP Clause’s ends.
4. Treaty Powers. The federal government’s treaty powers also
might come into conflict with the IP Clause’s external limitations. As
I discuss here, the federal government’s traditional treaty power is
not a congressional power in the way that the commerce, spending,
and necessary-and-proper powers are. When the federal government
is exercising this traditional power, a reasonable argument can be
made for the proposition that the IP Clause does not externally limit
this power. This argument is somewhat less powerful, however, with
respect to non-self-executing treaties, which Congress implements
through legislation. Furthermore, the IP Clause even more likely
imposes external limits on Congress when it enacts congressionalexecutive agreements.
According to Article II of the Constitution, the president “shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
264
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”
265
The Supreme Court, in Missouri v. Holland, approved a broad
understanding of this treaty power. In upholding a treaty between the
United States and Great Britain regulating the killing of migratory
birds, the Court rejected the argument that “what an act of Congress
could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the
266
States, a treaty cannot do.” That is, even if Congress lacks authority
to regulate the killing of migratory birds with its Article I, Section 8
powers—particularly the Commerce Clause—that fact alone does not

263.
264.
265.
266.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 432.
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prohibit the federal government from exercising its Article II
267
treatymaking powers to accomplish the same effect.
Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court recognized in Reid v.
268
Covert, the Article II treaty power does have limitations. In that
case, the Court struck down an executive agreement between the
United States and Great Britain that had “permitted United States’
military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
committed in Great Britain by American servicemen or their
dependents” because the agreement forced the wives of soldiers to be
tried in military court, depriving them of their Fifth and Sixth
269
Amendment rights. The Court reasoned that “[t]he prohibitions of
the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the
National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive
270
or by the Executive and the Senate combined.” In other words, the
Constitution’s prohibitions on governmental power trump the treaty
271
power.
When a treaty passed pursuant to the Article II treatymaking
power seeks to promote the progress of science and useful arts, one
could make a plausible case that the IP Clause does not externally
limit the treaty to using only the means specified in the IP Clause
272
itself. As Professor Graeme Dinwoodie observes, “[T]he Treaty
Clause presents a weaker case for the imposition of structural
constraints not only because the limits in the [IP] Clause appear
unrelated to the structure of government, but also because the
independent exercise of the Treaty Clause appears affirmatively
273
supportive of a governmental vision contained in the Constitution.”
Specifically, the treaty power is situated among the president’s

267. Id. at 432–35.
268. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
269. Id. at 15–18; accord id. at 49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
270. Id. at 17 (plurality opinion).
271. Id. at 17–18.
272. Cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)Nationalist
Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 362–63 (2007) (arguing that
copyright laws passed pursuant to the treaty powers are likely to be valid if they “seek[] to
ensure domestic compliance with real international obligations” and are “adopted through a
process involving real political checks on legislative lawmaking,” even if they do not comply
with the IP Clause’s means); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause:
Are There Limits on the United States’ Ability To Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1, 4 (2004) (arguing that the IP Clause should not limit the Treaty Clause when the subject
matter of a given treaty is international).
273. Dinwoodie, supra note 272, at 372.
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powers in Article II, not Congress’s powers in Article I, Section 8. It
specifies a treatymaking process that involves the president and the
Senate, not the whole Congress. As such, one might question whether
the external limitations that the IP Clause imposes on Congress’s
other powers also restrict the treaty power, given that treatymaking is
not a congressional power, even if the Senate is constitutionally
integral to the process.
The question can be restated more generally: Does the IP Clause
establish external limitations only on congressional legislation—as
with the legislation passed under the Commerce Clause in Missouri v.
Holland—or more broadly on federal governmental action, including
the exercise of the treaty power—just as the Sixth Amendment
created such a restriction in Reid v. Covert? The evidence set forth in
Part I does not seem to shed light directly on the intersection between
treatymaking and the IP Clause. Structurally speaking, the IP
Clause—situated in Article I—might limit Congress’s powers when
the legislature acts bicamerally, but not the Article II treatymaking
274
powers employed jointly by the president and the Senate. Although
this structural analysis might seem formalistic, an exercise of the
Article II treatymaking powers is designed to ensure that the
president and Senate represent the country’s interests broadly with
regard to other countries, as compared with the more regionally
grounded House of Representatives, which by design has a greater
275
hand in Article I legislation. As Professor Dinwoodie notes, “[T]he
values that lawmakers might need to pursue at the international level,
or the means through which they might pursue them, might depart
276
from those ends or means that are desirable domestically.”
Still, the argument that the IP Clause does not limit treaties is
not airtight. For one thing, if the argument is correct, then the federal
government could easily circumvent the IP Clause’s limitations
277
through treatymaking instead of Article I legislation. Moreover, the

274. Id. at 381.
275. Id. at 379.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 378 (“[W]hat is the point of limits in one clause if these can easily be
circumvented by reliance on another broader grant?”); Richard B. Graves III, Globalization,
Treaty Powers, and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Clause, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 199, 210 (2003) (“[T]he federal government could enter into a treaty for the purpose of
circumventing limitations on Congressional lawmaking authority. There is good reason to
believe that the scope of the treaty enacted for this purpose would not be restricted to external
matters.”).
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historical evidence discussed in Part I shows that the IP Clause was
believed in one circumstance to limit externally a power exercised
278
under Article IV, beyond Article I. It might similarly limit a power
exercised under Article II; but then, the Article II treaty power is
granted to the president as well as to the Senate, whereas the Article
IV power in that historical example was provided solely to Congress.
Furthermore, even if Article II self-executing treaties are not
limited externally by the IP Clause, non-self-executing treaties might
be so limited. Although both kinds of treaties are made pursuant to
279
Article II, the former become law without any need for Congress to
280
activate them via Article I, whereas the latter come into effect only
if Congress uses Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause to enact
281
appropriate legislation. Therefore, one might argue that whenever
Congress uses its Article I powers to implement non-self-executing
treaties—the only powers it has at its disposal to do so—the IP Clause
282
externally limits the legislature to the Clause’s specified means. The
reasoning goes that whereas the non-self-executing treaty in Holland
could be implemented via the Necessary and Proper Clause even
though the Commerce Clause was unavailable, the same could not be
said of the IP Clause, because unlike the Commerce Clause, the IP
Clause externally limits the other Article I powers. This argument for
different treatment, however, is weak, primarily because of the
strange state of affairs that would result if Article II were to allow the
United States to take on a treaty obligation that it could not then
implement via Article I.
Regardless, my analysis suggests that good reasons exist to think
that the IP Clause externally limits the government’s power to enact
treaty-like congressional-executive agreements. A congressionalexecutive agreement is an agreement negotiated by the president with
one or more other countries, which is then adopted bicamerally by

278. See supra text accompanying notes 110–12.
279. Benjamin Beiter, Note, Beyond Medellín: Reconsidering Federalism Limits on the
Treaty Power, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1163, 1194 n.206 (2010).
280. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356–57 (2008).
281. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). Some scholars argue that Holland was
wrongly decided and that Congress should be allowed to implement non–self-executing treaties
pursuant only to Article I powers other than the Necessary and Proper Clause. E.g., Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1880–92 (2005);
Beiter, supra note 279, at 1194.
282. See supra Part III.
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283

Assuming that
Congress like ordinary Article I legislation.
congressional-executive agreements are a constitutional form of
284
lawmaking, they are enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8 rather
285
than Article II. As such, the accepted understanding is that these
agreements are subject to Article I’s limitations, even when Article II
286
treaties are not. These agreements would thus be limited externally
by the IP Clause to using the means provided in that Clause.
The predominant international agreements in intellectual
property have been implemented bicamerally through Article I
legislation, either because the underlying treaties were non-selfexecuting or because they were forms of congressional-executive
agreement. For instance, the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related
287
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
which sets
minimum standards for intellectual-property laws, was implemented
288
by the United States as a congressional-executive agreement. This
Article’s reasoning provides a strong case that the TRIPS agreement,
having been enacted pursuant to Article I, is externally limited by the
IP Clause.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
289
Works, which governs copyright law, is a non-self-executing treaty

283. Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 422
(1989).
284. Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799, 913–14 (1995) (arguing that they are), with Tribe, supra note 27, at 1249–51
(expressing skepticism).
285. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance,
119 YALE L.J. 140, 259–60, 261–63 (2009); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality
of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 763–64 (2001).
286. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of International Delegation, 118
YALE L.J. 1712, 1747 (2009) (“[C]ongressional-executive agreements, dependent on Article I
powers, are not interchangeable with treaties on matters reaching beyond the enumerated
powers.”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 691 n.397 (2008) (“The option of a
congressional-executive agreement is unavailable for agreements that address matters beyond
Congress’s legislative power under Article I.”).
287. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
288. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); see also Memorandum for the United States
Trade Representative, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,263, 67,267 (Dec. 20, 1993) (describing the president’s
negotiations with Congress regarding the agreement).
289. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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that the Senate ratified and Congress implemented in 1988. As just
discussed,
the
arguments
about
whether
congressional
implementation of this non-self-executing treaty should be limited by
the IP Clause’s external limitations are weakly colorable.
In sum, the federal government’s treaty powers and the IP
Clause’s external limits may collide. One would most expect a
collision when Congress enacts a congressional-executive agreement;
one would expect it less when Congress implements a non-selfexecuting treaty; and one would least expect it when the federal
government enacts a self-executing treaty.
*

*

*

Although other powers might come into conflict with the IP
Clause’s external limits, the commerce, spending, necessary-andproper, and treaty powers are those most likely to clash with them
because those powers are broad and are responsible for much federal
lawmaking. Each is capable of being invoked in ways that the IP
Clause would seem to restrain.
This Part’s analysis has mostly assumed that enacted laws have a
singular purpose and that collisions between the IP Clause’s external
limitations and other constitutional powers take place when Congress
uses those powers as a cover for promoting the progress of science
and useful arts using means not authorized in the IP Clause. A
nuanced analysis, however, allows for the possibility that Congress
might have legitimate interests in enacting legislation in addition to
291
promoting the progress of science and useful arts. Many of these
legitimate interests are likely to be pursuant to those powers just
discussed that are likely to collide with the IP Clause’s external
limitations. In those instances, the presumption framework outlined
in Section A should apply to permit Congress to enact legislation in
spite of the IP Clause’s external limitations, as long as clear and
convincing evidence exists that Congress considered those other
interests legitimate enough to override the IP Clause’s external
limitations. As a practical matter, this framework might enable
Congress to bypass the IP Clause’s external limitations whenever it
wants merely by giving lip service to other more permissive

290. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat.
2853, 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 note (2006)).
291. See supra Part II.A.
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constitutional powers, such as the Commerce Clause or the treaty
powers, to override the IP Clause’s limited means. This situation
might sometimes happen, as unfortunate as it may be. There is
perhaps no better solution, however, given the recognition that
Congress might have truly legitimate trade, foreign-relations, or other
interests in enacting laws with the IP Clause’s ends that extend
beyond its means. At worst, the presumption framework would force
Congress to consider clearly—and one would hope carefully—
whether it is transgressing the IP Clause’s important external
limitations. Moreover, because the presumption would be extremely
difficult to overcome for laws whose means subvert the IP Clause’s
means, those laws would be less likely to be deemed to be
constitutional.
Bearing this general analysis in mind, I now turn to an
exploration of some existing federal laws that might be
unconstitutional in light of the foregoing analysis.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL FEDERAL LAWS?
For most of the nation’s history, few federal laws were passed
that might even questionably transgress the limited means specified in
the IP Clause. Whatever the cause—be it globalization, an expansive
Commerce Clause, or recklessness—starting in the late twentieth
century, Congress proposed or enacted a number of federal laws of
dubious constitutionality in light of the IP Clause’s external
292
limitations. This Part explores some of those laws—trade-secrecy,
antibootlegging, copyright-restoration, and database-protection—
analyzing their constitutionality in light of the analytical framework
proposed in Part II. This Part also investigates the constitutionality of
federal laws establishing the federal funding of scientific and artistic
works. As the analysis in this Part demonstrates, the framework
proposed by this Article is straightforward in its application. Even
when the conclusion to be drawn is not obvious, use of the framework
focuses and sharpens the analysis.
A. Trade Secrecy
This Section describes Congress’s legislation protecting trade
secrets from misappropriation. I show that this law has a strong

292. Cf. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1168 n.359 (observing that the earlier absence of
questionable laws “might itself be evidence of the unconstitutionality of such statutes”).
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structural purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful
arts, but that it does not comply with the IP Clause’s limited means.
Moreover, although the law also has a weighty legitimate purpose of
promoting trade and interstate commerce, Congress did not leave
clear evidence that it thought commerce interests ought to take
precedence over the IP Clause’s external limitations. As such, the
legislation is constitutionally problematic. Given that President
Obama’s Justice Department has called for greater use of this law in
293
prosecuting trade-secret misappropriation, its constitutional status is
ever more important.
294
In 1996, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act,
295
providing the first general federal protection for trade secrecy.
Among other things, it provides that
[w]hoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or
included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or
foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the
owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure
any owner of that trade secret, knowingly . . . [misappropriates]
shall . . . be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
296
years, or both.

The law defines trade secrets as
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information . . . if— (A) the owner thereof
has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value . . . from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
297
through proper means by, the public.

The Senate report on the bill explains that this law has two
purposes: “to promote the development and lawful utilization of
United States proprietary economic information produced for, or
293. Gary G. Grindler, Aggressive IP Enforcement Is a Must, NAT’L L.J. (May 3, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202453202819. At the time he wrote this
article, Gary Grindler was the acting deputy attorney general and chairman of the Department
of Justice’s Task Force on Intellectual Property. Id.
294. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2006)).
295. Other federal laws protect trade secrets narrowly and for different purposes, such as to
guard against federal employees’ unauthorized disclosure of certain confidential information.
E.g.,18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006).
296. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2006).
297. Id. § 1839(3).
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placed in, interstate and foreign commerce by protecting it
from . . . misappropriation” and “to secure to authors and inventors
298
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” The
first purpose corresponds with Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause, and the second corresponds with Congress’s
299
power under the IP Clause. The report explains further that
Congress has heretofore confined its protection of intellectual
property to patented and copyrighted material. With this legislation,
Congress extends the protection of Federal law to the equally
important area of proprietary economic information. During the
course of the Committee’s hearings, we documented that
proprietary economic information is vital to the prosperity of the
American economy, that it is increasingly the target of thieves, and
that our current laws are inadequate to punish people who steal the
300
information.

As the report confirms, then, with the Economic Espionage Act, the
Senate expressly set out to protect a broader swath of material in a
manner akin to Congress’s protection of patentable and copyrightable
material. Although the law is primarily occupied with promoting the
country’s economic status, it is also focused on safeguarding
information that might otherwise be protected by existing copyright
301
and patent law.
The Economic Espionage Act comports with a general
understanding of trade-secret laws’ purposes. As the Supreme Court
has reasoned, along with “maintenance of standards of commercial
ethics,” a primary purpose of trade-secrecy protection is “the
302
encouragement of invention.” Scholars emphasize trade secrecy’s
303
important role in fostering scientific and technological innovation.
Like patent law, trade-secrecy protection encourages investment in
scientific and technological research by “giv[ing] the developer of
new and valuable information the right to restrict others from using it,

298. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 2 (1996).
299. Id. at 4.
300. Id. at 5–6.
301. Id. at 14.
302. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
303. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 329–32 (2008).
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and therefore the prospect of deriving supracompetitive profits from
304
the information.”
This discussion indicates that the law’s structural effects are to
protect economic development and to promote the progress of
science and useful arts. As to the former effect, the law protects many
things that are primarily helpful in facilitating commerce, such as
305
customer lists and customer research. As to the latter, it promotes
the progress of science and useful arts by encouraging investment in
scientific and technological research because it authorizes punishment
306
for those who misappropriate such information. In fact, nearly every
reported judicial opinion resulting from a prosecution under this law
seems to involve this latter variety of trade secret, the variety whose
protection is intended to promote the progress of science and useful
307
arts. Although courts and commentators have debated whether
308
trade-secrecy protection interferes with patent law’s operation, few
dispute that the two regimes have, in large part, the same aim: the
constitutional end laid out in the IP Clause of promoting the progress
of science and useful arts. As such, to the extent that the law is
protecting scientific and technological information from
misappropriation, it must comply with the IP Clause’s specified

304. Id. at 330.
305. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006) (protecting “financial, business, [or]
economic . . . information”).
306. See id. (protecting “scientific, technical, . . . or engineering information”).
307. See e.g., United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 540–44 (6th Cir. 2002) (scientific
information about adhesives research); United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535, 536–37 (6th Cir.
2001) (“new process for applying hard coatings to the laminate contact surfaces of caul plates”);
United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 8–10 (1st Cir. 2000) (composition of veterinary diagnostic
tests and research-and-development data); United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 191–92 (3d Cir.
1998) (“processes, methods, and formulas for manufacturing Taxol, an anti-cancer drug”);
United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“computer programs
used to operate [a financial firm’s] high-frequency trading system”); United States v. Genovese,
409 F. Supp. 2d 253, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (source code).
308. Compare Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989)
(concluding that state unfair-competition and trade-secret laws are not inconsistent with patent
law), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474–93 (1974) (distinguishing between
the federal exclusivity of the IP Clause and states’ ability to protect trade secrets and intellectual
property), with Jeanne C. Fromer, Trade Secrecy in Willy Wonka’s Chocolate Factory, in THE
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 3, 6
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (describing how the “central
innovations in the candy industry” are protected by trade secrecy even when patent protection
might be obtained), and Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial
Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 708 (1996) (noting that industrialists
often prefer trade secrets, which “encompass some of the most valuable intellectual property”).
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means unless clear and convincing evidence exists that commerce
interests superseded the IP Clause’s external limitations.
Federal trade-secrecy law does not confine itself to the Clause’s
means. Putting aside the issue of whether the law’s criminal and
309
injunctive relief confer exclusive rights on inventors as the IP
Clause requires, the law provides protection of potentially unlimited
duration. As long as the holder of a trade secret complies with the
law’s secrecy requirements and as long as a third party does not
uncover the secret by proper means, such as independent discovery or
310
reverse engineering, the law’s protection endures. Because one can
conceive of scenarios involving protected trade secrets in which
protection would not endure for “limited Times,” the law contravenes
the IP Clause’s prescribed means. Moreover, there is no evidence that
Congress deliberately chose to contravene the IP Clause’s means to
protect weightier commercial interests, suggesting that the
311
presumption of unconstitutionality is not overcome here.
By contrast, former Professor Patry argues that federal tradesecrecy laws are not constitutionally problematic under the IP
312
Clause. Patry asserts that the purpose of trade-secrecy laws is
distinct from that of patent and copyright laws: the goal of the former
is to protect against industrial espionage, whereas the goal of the
313
latter is to advance knowledge and technology. In Patry’s view,
trade-secret laws do not protect “Writings” per se but rather protect
309. Professors Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry think that federal trade-secrecy laws are
constitutional. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1194–95. They also reason that the Economic
Espionage Act does not establish exclusive rights, but rather merely supplements existing
common-law remedies, and therefore does not fall within the ambit of the IP Clause’s
limitations. Id. Yet if Professors Heald and Sherry are correct that trade-secrecy protection is
not an exclusive right, then that premise supplies all the more reason for concluding that the law
transgresses the IP Clause’s limited means of promoting innovation.
310. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1622 (2011) (“[T]rade secrecy protection can theoretically provide even
more powerful incentives than patents because trade secrecy rights are potentially infinite in
duration.”); David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 156–57 (2007) (“So long as the elements of trade secrecy are
met, the right to keep a secret for an infinite period of time underscores the real power of
enjoying trade secret protection.”).
311. Congress is less likely to provide this clear evidence absent an adopted framework
encouraging it to do so. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–63 (1995) (encouraging
Congress to make express findings supporting a law’s link to interstate commerce by
underscoring the findings’ relevance to a determination whether Congress acted permissibly
within its commerce power).
312. Patry, supra note 17, at 394.
313. Id.
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the right to be free from theft, especially because material that is
reverse engineered—and thus that is available to the public without
314
misappropriation—is not protectable as a trade secret. Because,
according to Patry, these laws do not protect the secrets themselves so
much as they protect this more abstract right to be free from theft,
they are not within the reach of the IP Clause’s limitations and are
315
thus constitutionally unproblematic.
This analysis is insufficiently nuanced. Trade-secrecy protection
surely seeks to protect against industrial espionage, but the statute’s
structural purpose also includes the goal of advancing knowledge and
technology. As such, my framework turns the analysis of former
Professor Patry on its head: if Patry is correct that the trade-secret
statute does not protect “Writings,” then as a law aimed at promoting
the progress of science and useful arts, it actually complies with one
fewer of the IP Clause’s means. Thus, on former Professor Patry’s
theory, trade-secret laws are constitutionally problematic for an
additional reason.
In sum, Congress’s incursion into trade-secret protection with the
Economic Espionage Act is constitutionally problematic. The statute
has a strong structural purpose of promoting the progress of science
and useful arts, but it exceeds the IP Clause’s means. To the extent
that Congress attempts to promote the IP Clause’s goals, it cannot use
its other more expansive powers, such as its power under the
Commerce Clause, to protect information that promotes the progress
of science and useful arts without making a clear decision to
supersede the IP Clause’s means because of prevalent commerce
interests. By contrast, Congress’s protection of other information,
such as customer lists, is not constitutionally problematic because that
protection is about promoting commerce, not promoting the progress
of science and useful arts.
B. Antibootlegging
Another provision of doubtful constitutionality is the federal
antibootlegging provision. In 1994, Congress enacted this provision in
316
the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA), which implemented
aspects of a number of multilateral trade agreements, including
314. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
315. Id.
316. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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317

TRIPS, a treaty concerned with intellectual property. The TRIPS
agreement requires member countries to establish minimum
standards for copyright, patent, trademark, and other intellectual318
property laws. Among these standards is the ability of performers to
prevent unauthorized “fixation of their unfixed performance and the
319
reproduction of such fixation.”
Pursuant to TRIPS, Congress implemented the first federal
antibootlegging protection by enacting the URAA. According to this
provision,
[a]nyone who, without the consent of the performer or performers
involved—
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical
performance in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or
phonorecords of such a performance from an unauthorized
fixation,
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the
sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance, or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents
or offers to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as
described in paragraph (1), . . .
shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502 through
320
505, to the same extent as an infringer of copyright.

The remedies mentioned in this provision include injunctions,
321
impoundment, and damages. The URAA also includes a parallel
criminal provision authorizing possible fines, a prison term of up to
322
ten years, forfeiture, and destruction of the recordings.
The criminal provision’s constitutionality has been challenged in
prosecutions under the provision. Challengers have alleged that
Congress, in enacting the URAA, impermissibly employed means

317. See supra text accompanying notes 287–88.
318. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 287, pt. II.
319. Id. art. 14(1). The earlier Berne Convention permitted countries to provide copyright
protection to unfixed works but did not require them to do so. Berne Convention, supra note
289, art. 2, paras. 1–2. The United States acceded to the convention without providing such
protection. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
320. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006).
321. Id. §§ 502–504.
322. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006).
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beyond the limited ones specified in the IP Clause. They have claimed
both that the law provides protection for performances that are not
“Writings” and that the protection is perpetual, no durational
323
provision having been included in the law. Each final court that has
considered a constitutional challenge has rejected it, reasoning that
Congress had the authority to enact the law under the Commerce
Clause, even if the IP Clause does not authorize the means
324
employed.
This Section argues that in light of the IP Clause’s external
limitations, these courts were too quick to reject the constitutional
challenges.
The structural purpose of the URAA’s antibootlegging provision
is indubitably the promotion of the progress of science and useful
arts. For one thing, when Congress enacted this law, it labeled both
325
the civil and criminal laws as “[c]opyright [p]rovisions.” The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary that helped craft the implementation of
TRIPS stated that it was doing so “to safeguard intellectual property
326
rights.” Congress chose to place the civil provision in Title 17 of the
327
U.S. Code with extant copyright law. The civil remedies the law
328
authorizes are incorporated from existing copyright laws.
The antibootlegging provision thus seems to have been enacted
pursuant to the IP Clause. The civil provision of the Act makes no
329
mention of commerce, and it was not enacted pursuant to the
Article II treaty power. Because TRIPS is a congressional-executive
agreement, the antibootlegging provision therefore must have been
enacted pursuant to some Article I power, presumably the IP

323. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Moghadam,
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999); KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d
1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
324. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 149–52; Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280; KISS Catalog, 405 F.
Supp. 2d at 1172–74.
325. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. V, subtit. A, 108 Stat. 4809,
4974 (1994).
326. S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 224 (1994); cf. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (“The specific
context in which [the law] was enacted involved a treaty with foreign nations, called for by the
World Trade Organization, whose purpose was to ensure uniform recognition and treatment of
intellectual property in international commerce.”).
327. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 512, 108 Stat. at 4974 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 320–21.
329. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143.
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Clause. The provision, however, does not comply with the IP
Clause’s limited means, both because it protects unfixed works and
because it lacks a durational provision to limit the protection.
The IP Clause enables Congress to grant exclusive rights to
331
authors in their “Writings.” Given that the first federal copyright
law, passed in 1790, provided copyright protection just to books,
332
maps, and charts, later observers had some difficulty determining
333
The
how broadly the term “Writings” should be construed.
Supreme Court ruled that the term was not limited strictly to textual
materials when it decided that a photograph of Oscar Wilde was a
334
copyrightable “Writing[].”
In so doing, the Court construed
“Writings” beyond the term’s colloquial understanding. It reasoned
that photographs constitute “Writings” “so far as they are
335
representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”
In another case, the Court reasoned more generally that
“‘Writings’ . . . [are not] construed in their narrow literal sense but,
rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of
336
constitutional principles.” In the same decision, the Supreme Court
held that “recordings of artistic performances” constitute writings,
337
even though they are not visually perceptible. The Court reasoned
that recordings are “physical rendering[s] of the fruits of creative
338
intellectual or aesthetic labor.” Although it did not expressly say so,
the Court suggested that “Writings” must be physical renderings; by
implication, performances that are not physically rendered—and thus
339
that are not fixed—cannot be “Writings.”

330. See supra Part II.B.4.
331. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
332. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
333. Cf. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2387 (“[P]rotection for maps and charts
reflects a nonliteral reading of the Copyright Clause.”).
334. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56–60 (1884).
335. Id. at 58.
336. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
337. Id. at 561–62.
338. Id. at 561.
339. Cf. id. (“[A]lthough the word ‘writings’ might be limited to script or printed material, it
may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or
aesthetic labor.”); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (suggesting that “Writings”
does not include ideas, which are distinct from “the words in which those ideas are clothed”). In
ruling on whether the term “Writings” embodied a constitutional requirement of originality, the
Court relayed Congress’s observation that “[t]he two fundamental criteria of copyright
protection [are] originality and fixation.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
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Most scholars are persuaded that unfixed performances lie
340
outside the scope of “Writings.” Professor David Nimmer reasons
that “[i]f the word ‘writings’ is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it
must, at the very least, denote some material form, capable of
341
identification and having a more or less permanent endurance.”
Moreover, federal copyright laws, from the earliest to the more
342
modern versions, have not protected unfixed works. In fact,
proposals to confer copyright protection on unfixed works have been
met with staunch criticism that such works are impermissibly
343
intangible. The consistent decision not to protect unfixed works,
combined with the term “Writings” in the IP Clause, strongly suggests
344
that only fixed works are “Writings.”
Fixation can be regarded as an integral prerequisite to copyright
protection for a number of reasons. First, the benefits society receives
from artistic works’ being created and eventually moved into the
public domain are unlikely to happen without fixation. Fixation
ensures that cultural creations remain available for public use long
345
after their creation. Second, fixation can help as an evidentiary
matter by delineating precisely a work’s expression, so that it cannot
346
later be disputed in an infringement claim.
That said, a minority of scholars think that “Writings” can
encompass unfixed works. Some reason that once “Writings” is read
nonliterally, as the Supreme Court has read it, no reason remains to
355 (1991) (second alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); S. REP.
NO. 94-473, at 50 (1975)).
340. E.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 1.08[C][2]; Larissa Mann, If It Ain’t
Broke . . . Copyright’s Fixation Requirement and Cultural Citizenship, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
201, 202 & n.3 (2011).
341. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 1.08[C][2] (internal quotation marks omitted).
342. See Merschman, supra note 43, at 682 (noting “Congress’s continuous precedent of
protecting only fixed works for more than two centuries”).
343. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, How To Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the
Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 845 (2009) (“[P]roposals [to extend
copyright protection to the efforts of performers] were met with opposition by, for example, the
Committee on Copyrights of the American Bar Association based on its ‘attempt to protect
performing rights of an intangible nature.’” (quoting Everett N. Curtis, Otto F. Barthel, Louis
Charles Smith & George P. Dike, Report of the Committee on Copyrights, 1937 A.B.A. SEC.
PAT. TRADE-MARK & COPYRIGHT L. REP. 11, 12–13)).
344. See id. at 852 (“If ‘writings’ is interpreted as meaning, at the very least, something in
tangible form, one might conclude that Congress could not constitutionally extend copyright
protection to unfixed works . . . .”).
345. Merschman, supra note 43, at 663–64.
346. See id. at 683 (“[T]he evidentiary role that fixation plays in the copyright system is
fundamental to preserving the expression/idea dichotomy.”).
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insist on a distinction between fixed and unfixed works. The
reasoning advanced by Professor Nimmer, however, suggests
348
otherwise. Others respond that an unfixed performative work
“clearly is a physical rendering of the fruits of aesthetic labor”
because it “is capable of being perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
349
communicated” through a performance. That observation is true
enough, but unfixed performances are unlike the various works the
Court has found to constitute “Writings,” and the Court has hinted
that they do not belong to the same class.
If the majority’s analysis is correct, then live performances—
protected by the antibootlegging provision of the URAA—are not
350
“Writings.”
As such, the antibootlegging provision is not in
compliance with the IP Clause’s external limitations because it seeks
to promote the progress of science and useful arts without confining
itself to the IP Clause’s prescribed means.
Another reason exists to doubt the law’s constitutionality: it
351
lacks a provision limiting the duration of protection. Absent a
court’s reading such a provision into the law, live musical
performances could be protected eternally from bootlegging.
Although some commentators suggest that copyright’s durational
352
limitation ought to be incorporated into the antibootlegging law,
353
courts have been hesitant to do so.
347. See, e.g., 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 17.6.1 (3d ed. 2005)
(“There is little doubt that the performances subject to protection are ‘writings’ in the
constitutional sense for, beyond literalism, there is nothing in the mechanical act of fixation to
distinguish writings from nonwritings.”); Heymann, supra note 343, at 856 (“[T]here is no
defensible reason to restrict [copyright] protection to fixed works . . . .”).
348. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
349. Leslie Erin Wallis, Comment, The Different Art: Choreography and Copyright, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1442, 1461, 1466 (1986); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving
Personality and Reputational Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A
Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 164 n.100 (citing Wallis, supra,
at 1461, 1466).
350. See generally Dotan Oliar, Resolving Conflicts Among Congress’s Powers Regarding
Statutes’ Constitutionality: The Case of Anti-Bootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467,
489–91 (2007) (discussing this view).
351. See id. at 491–92 (“The overwhelming majority of courts and commentators suggest
that the anti-bootlegging statutes violate the limited times requirement.”).
352. E.g., Angela T. Howe, United States v. Martignon & KISS Catalog v. Passport
International Products: The Anti-Bootlegging Statute and the Collision of International
Intellectual Property Law and the United States Constitution, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 851
(2005).
353. See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 n.9 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We
note that the anti-bootlegging statute may be faced with another constitutional problem under
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Because the antibootlegging provision regulates works that are
likely not “Writings,” because it lacks any durational limitation, and
because the structural purpose of the law is to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, the provision is of dubious constitutionality.
Moreover, it cannot overcome any presumption against
constitutionality because there is no clear and convincing evidence
that Congress intended another legitimate constitutional interest to
take precedence and thereby supersede the IP Clause’s external
limitations. The federal government’s attempt to classify this law ex
post as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce
354
Clause does nothing to change the fact that the actual and only
structural purpose reflected in the law is to promote the progress of
science and useful arts.
C. Copyright Restoration
Another law that raises constitutional doubts is the copyright355
restoration provision Congress passed in 1994, also in the URAA.
The law restored copyright protection for certain foreign works that
had fallen into the public domain in the United States—due, among
other things, to “lack of national eligibility” or “noncompliance with
formalities imposed at any time by United States copyright law”—but
whose copyrights had not yet expired in the creators’ home
356
countries. Included among the works whose copyrights were so
restored were “films by Alfred Hitchcock and Federico Fellini, books
by C.S. Lewis and Virginia Woolf, symphonies by Prokofiev and
357
Stravinsky and paintings by Picasso.” The Berne Convention
358
requires copyright restoration, but Congress did not comply with
this requirement when it acceded to Berne in 1989. Then, the TRIPS

the Copyright Clause. . . . [W]e decline to address the argument in light of our disposition of this
case.”); KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 n.7 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) (“Because the United States agreed that the durational limitation of 17 U.S.C. § 302
cannot be incorporated into the Statute, the Court assumes, without deciding, that it is not
incorporated.”).
354. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2007); Moghadam, 175 F.3d
at 1274–75; KISS Catalog, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
355. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 504, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81
(1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109(a) (2006)).
356. Id.
357. Adam Liptak, Once in the Public’s Hands, Now Back in Picasso’s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2011, at A17.
358. Berne Convention, supra note 289, art. 18.
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agreement required signatories to implement this Berne provision.
Only when Congress implemented parts of TRIPS did it provide for
copyright restoration for foreign works.
360
In Golan v. Holder, this provision was challenged on the
ground that restoring the copyrights to works that have entered the
361
public domain violates the IP Clause’s constraints. It was also
362
challenged as a violation of the First Amendment, an issue I do not
take up here. The Tenth Circuit rejected the constitutional
363
challenge. As for the IP Clause, the court reasoned that “the
decision to comply with the Berne Convention, which secures
copyright protections for American works abroad, [was not] so
irrational or so unrelated to the aims of the Copyright Clause that it
364
exceed[ed] the reach of congressional power.” In a similar, earlier
challenge to the legislation’s constitutionality, the D.C. Circuit also
upheld the provision, reasoning that the IP Clause does not limit
Congress from authorizing protection for material in the public
365
domain. The Supreme Court agreed with both circuit court rulings
and upheld Congress’s authority to enact this law pursuant to the IP
366
Clause.
Congress’s interests in enacting this legislation seemed to be both
complying with international obligations and promoting the progress
of science and useful arts. The federal government asserted that it had
three interests in enacting the law: “(1) attaining indisputable
compliance with international treaties and multilateral agreements,
(2) obtaining legal protections for American copyright holders’
interests abroad, and (3) remedying past inequities of foreign authors
367
who lost or never obtained copyrights in the United States.” The

359. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 287, art. 9(1).
360. Golan v. Holder (Golan III), 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
361. See id. at 878 (“Petitioners . . . . maintain that [under] the Constitution’s Copyright and
Patent Clause, . . . . a work that has entered the public domain, for whatever reason, must
forever remain there.”).
362. Id.
363. Golan v. Holder (Golan II), 609 F.3d 1076, 1094 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873
(2012); Golan v. Gonzales (Golan I), 501 F.3d 1179, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2007).
364. Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1187.
365. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263–65 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
366. Golan III, 132 S. Ct. at 889.
367. Golan II, 609 F.3d at 1083. The Supreme Court accepted the first reason—maintaining
good foreign relations—by pointing to the Mexican, Thai, Russian, and other criticism of the
United States’ prior inaction to restore copyrights as Congress later did and an American desire
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first interest was compliance with international obligations, whereas
the next two were promoting the progress of science and useful arts:
the former by giving greater incentive to American authors to create
and the latter by giving an incentive to foreign authors to develop and
market their works.
Because Congress passed the law to comply with TRIPS, one
might suggest that it was thus using an Article I power—presumably
the IP Clause—as its source of authority for implementing a
congressional-executive agreement. Yet the story is more complicated
than that because TRIPS required the United States to comply with
368
the Berne Convention on copyright restoration. The United States
369
acceded to Berne pursuant to its Article II treatymaking power.
Therefore, as an alternative to legislating under the IP Clause, by
implementing copyright restoration pursuant to TRIPS, Congress
370
may have been using the Necessary and Proper Clause. As
discussed in Part II.B.4, although a case might be made that Article II
treaties, particularly non-self-executing ones, need to comply with the
IP Clause’s external limitations, one could mount a respectable
371
argument that they do not.
To the extent that the IP Clause limits the means that Congress
may employ in this context, Congress’s passage of the copyrightrestoration provision within the URAA might seem to exceed the
means authorized by the Clause. In fact, the law’s challengers argue
that extending copyright restoration to works already in the public
372
domain violates the IP Clause’s “limited Times” restriction. These
challengers assert that once a work has moved into the public domain,
373
its limited time of protection is at an end and cannot be restored.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, effectively
reasoning that a one-time restoration of copyrights to some works for
to avoid a trade-enforcement proceeding in the World Trade Organization on that basis. Golan
III, 132 S. Ct. at 880–82.
368. See supra text accompanying note 359.
369. See supra Part II.B.4.
370. This argument is weakened by Congress’s 1988 statements that the legislature did not
need to implement copyright restoration to comply with the Berne Convention. See THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 323,
reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 656, 992 (1994) (“Before the United States adhered to
the Berne Convention in 1989, Congress determined that the United States was in compliance
with Article 18 of the Convention . . . .”).
371. See supra Part II.B.4.
372. E.g., Golan I, 501 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007).
373. Golan III, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012).
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a finite time is well within Congress’s power to confer rights in
374
intellectual property for limited times.
375
By interpreting the “limited Times” provision as it did, the
Supreme Court avoided—and perhaps consciously ducked—having to
address whether and how the IP Clause’s external limitations tie
Congress’s hands and prevent it from restoring copyright protection
to works that have already fallen into the public domain.
D. Database Protection
Legislation involving database protection is another area of
statutory law that raises constitutional uncertainty. As of 2012,
Congress had not yet passed into law any such protection, but many
bills had been introduced on the topic in the preceding years. In 1991,
the Supreme Court cast doubt on the possibility of using copyright
law broadly to protect information databases. The Court ruled that
databases constitutionally fall within the purview of the copyright
laws only when the database compiler for whom the protection is
intended “chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them,
and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used
effectively by readers . . . . so long as [the choices] are made
independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of
376
creativity.”
Absent such conditions, protection for databases

374. Id. at 884.
375. Another possible interpretation of the provision was colorable. The historical evidence
on the precise definition of “limited Times” in this context is scant, Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1190–
91, and before Golan III, the Supreme Court had not ruled on it. It had stated in other contexts,
however, that the precise point of copyright and patent laws enacted pursuant to the IP Clause
is to ensure that the protected works will fall into the public domain for others to use freely.
E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
5–6 (1966). Moreover, in preemption decisions analyzing whether states could protect works
that had fallen into the public domain, the Court had reasoned that “that which is in the public
domain cannot be removed therefrom by action of the States.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); accord Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,
237 (1964) (“[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not
forbid others to copy that article.”). Implied in this reasoning was the notion that part and
parcel of the authority to grant exclusive rights for limited times is a concurrent lack of authority
to regulate once that time has expired. For a related discussion of former Professor Patry’s
argument that the IP Clause contains both positive and negative rights, see supra text
accompanying notes 180–83.
376. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
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transgresses the “Authors” and “Writings” requirements of the IP
377
Clause.
After this decision, Congress proposed various bills to protect
databases more comprehensively, although none of them passed into
378
379
law. Those bills relied on the Commerce Clause for their authority
because the IP Clause had been ruled off-limits for noncreative
databases. The remaining question is whether even that reliance on
the Commerce Clause was permissible in light of the IP Clause’s
external limitations.
Scholarship on the constitutional question is divided. For
example, Professors Heald and Sherry think that legislation
protecting databases is constitutionally problematic because “facts
have historically been considered to form a critical part of the public
380
domain, available for anyone to use.” Professor Pollack, however,
thinks that database protection is constitutional under the Commerce
381
Clause as long as it is limited to cases of market failure.
Much of this debate implicitly centers on whether the structural
purpose of database-protection laws is promoting the progress of
science and useful arts or fostering interstate commerce. If their
purpose is only the former, the laws must comply with the IP Clause’s
377. See id. at 346 (explaining that the Supreme Court has “made it unmistakably clear” that
“the crucial terms ‘authors’ and ‘writings’” both “presuppose a degree of originality”). But cf.
Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1867 (1990) (using history to show that early copyright
law protected “works of little personal authorship yet considerable expenditure of labor and
capital”).
378. See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261,
108th Cong. (2003) (proposing the “prohibit[ion of] the misappropriation of certain databases”);
Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong.
(1996) (proposing a statutory amendment “to promote investment and prevent intellectual
property piracy with respect to databases”). See generally Samuel E. Trosow, Sui Generis
Database Legislation: A Critical Analysis, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 534, 573–625 (2005) (reviewing
various unsuccessful proposals for “sui generis database legislation” that have come up before
“the U.S. Congress and at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)”).
379. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-349, pt. 1, at 16 (1999).
380. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1177–78; see also Patry, supra note 17, at 394–97
(criticizing a bill for effectively providing a property right in databases without requiring
originality, “any real effort or systematic organization,” or “investment of substantial monetary
resources”).
381. See Pollack, supra note 15, at 61 (“Market failure . . . might be sufficient reason to allow
the Commerce Clause to ground time-limited protection for an unoriginal work because market
failure allows a well-grounded conclusion that Congress is not doing an end run around the
Intellectual Property Clause—both in the sense of Congress’ intent and in the sense that the
result is unlikely to harm the avowed purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause, the progress
of science and useful arts.”).
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means, meaning no protection can be extended for databases that are
insufficiently original. If their purpose is just the latter, however, then
Congress has a wide berth to legislate to protect databases. Moreover,
if the laws have both purposes, Congress may constitutionally enact
them only if it sets out clear and convincing evidence that commercial
interests dictate superseding the IP Clause’s external limitations, a
requirement that will be very difficult to satisfy if the laws subvert the
IP Clause’s means rather than merely supplementing them. Overall,
which structural purpose is at issue in any given piece of legislation
depends heavily on the legislation’s particulars. For example, if a
database-protection law were to prohibit only business competitors
from extracting information from a database without authorization,
that fact would suggest that the law was occupied with promoting
382
commerce by encouraging investment in database development. By
contrast, the same inference would be absent if the law were to
prevent anyone from extracting information, even for noncompetitive
purposes; in that case, the law would be less about promoting
commerce and more about promoting the progress of science and
383
useful arts. Similarly, one could make the case that a law protecting
people who put a substantial investment into creating any sort of
database—not just people who make a creative or technical
contribution—is less interested in promoting the progress of science
384
and useful arts than in encouraging commerce. Whatever the
outcome, the framework for evaluating the IP Clause’s external
limitations crisply queues up the issues that must be answered.
E. Federal Funding of Artistic and Scientific Works
Possibly the most prominent category of federal action that
raises constitutional concerns in light of the IP Clause’s external
limitations is federal funding of artistic and scientific works. As this
Section shows, this practice seems to be constitutionally proper, if not
382. Cf. Benkler, supra note 16, at 597 (arguing that “[i]f in fact the important governmental
interest is to prevent undercutting of database producers by competitors who provide the same
product without paying the cost of its development,” then a provision that would extend beyond
“competition among producers of the same product” to affect “producers of different products
to the extent that one product is an improvement of, or uses as an input some of, the other
product” would be “unnecessarily broad”).
383. See id. at 596–97 (observing that if a particular bill “aims to prohibit use by users who
are not competitors, then the law is not an unfair competition law, but a property right, which
cannot be passed outside the Intellectual Property Clause”).
384. E.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51, 54–55 (1997).
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because of the Spending Clause, then because of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
General federal funding of the arts is of relatively modern
vintage. In the nation’s early years, few observers agreed that
government ought to play a role in funding art; private parties funded
385
it instead. In the early twentieth century, the federal government
occasionally funded art, not to support art itself but out of broader
economic concerns, such as the desire to create employment through
386
Works Progress Administration programs. In 1965, federal funding
of the arts was made systematic when Congress instituted the
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities “to develop and
promote a broadly conceived national policy of support for the
387
humanities and the arts in the United States.” The foundation was
authorized to provide grants for artistic and literary works and for
388
education in the arts and humanities. The material motivations for
this funding were the centrality of arts and humanities to American
citizens and the necessity “for the Federal Government to help create
and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought,
imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating
389
the release of this creative talent.” By 1998, the foundation—now
known as the National Endowment for the Arts—had distributed
390
over $3 billion in grants.
Like federal support for the arts, general federal funding of
scientific and technological research became systematic in the midtwentieth century. Before that, the federal government would
sometimes fund nonmedical research during wartime to develop
military technologies, as it did with World War II’s Manhattan

385. Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts: Free Expression and Political Control,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1970 (1990).
386. Id. Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly funded and promoted American
modern art in an attempt to establish preeminence over the Soviet Union. Frances Stonor
Saunders, Modern Art Was CIA ‘Weapon,’ INDEPENDENT (Oct. 22, 1995), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/modern-art-was-cia-weapon-1578808.html. These funding
activities were not in the service of promoting the progress of science and useful arts; as such,
they were outside the purview of the IP Clause’s external limitations.
387. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209,
§ 4(a)–(b), 79 Stat. 845, 846 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 953(a)–(b) (2006)).
388. Id. §§ 5–11, 79 Stat. at 846–54 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 954–960).
389. Id. § 2, 79 Stat. at 845 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 951).
390. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998).
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391

Project. Even though this research would often trickle down to
public uses, the funding was initiated to support the federal
392
government’s military function. Vannevar Bush, who was involved
in the Manhattan Project, proposed that the government begin
funding, through a federal agency, scientific research done by
393
universities and other research centers during peacetime. As a
result, in 1950, Congress created the National Science Foundation
394
(NSF). Among the goals established for the NSF by Congress were
“to initiate and support basic scientific [and engineering] research and
programs to strengthen scientific [and engineering] research potential
and . . . education programs” and “to foster the interchange of
scientific and engineering information among scientists and engineers
395
in the United States and foreign countries.” Moreover, Congress
articulated that it was founding the NSF because “the Nation’s
capacity to conduct high quality research and education programs and
to maintain its competitive position at the forefront of modern
science, engineering, and technology [was being] threatened by [a]
396
research capital deficit.” As of 2010, the NSF was funding about half
397
of colleges’ and universities’ basic nonmedical-research activities.
The federal government has a longer history of funding medical
research. In 1878, Congress appropriated funds for “investigating the
origin and causes of epidemic diseases, especially yellow fever and
398
cholera.” The next year, Congress created the National Board of
Health, the federal government’s first general and organized funder

391. See generally THE MANHATTAN PROJECT (Cynthia C. Kelly ed., 2009) (compiling
accounts of the Manhattan Project, from its genesis through its aftermath).
392. Other funding for military technology provided earlier in the United States’ history,
such as funding for the appointment of teachers of arts and sciences for military instruction,
Sidney Forman, Why the United States Military Academy Was Established in 1802, 29 MILITARY
AFF. 16, 22 (1965), similarly had no material structural purpose of promoting the progress of
science and useful arts.
393. Jeffrey A. Hart, Organizational Cultures in U.S. Research-Oriented Universities, in
ADAPTING UNIVERSITIES TO THE GLOBAL SOCIETY—A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 143,
143–44 (Charles F. Bonser ed., 2009).
394. National Science Foundation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-507, § 2, 64 Stat. 149, 149
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006)).
395. 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1), (3) (2006).
396. Id. § 1862a(a)(3).
397. Eve Heafey, Public Access to Science: The New Policy of the National Institutes of
Health in Light of Copyright Protections in National and International Law, 14 UCLA J.L. &
TECH., no. 2, 2010, at 1, 46.
398. Act of Dec. 21, 1878, Res. No. 2, 20 Stat. 487.
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399

of medical research. Having since changed its name to the National
Institutes of Health, the agency provides funding for a wide variety of
400
401
medical research, approximating $31.2 billion annually.
Funding for scientific and technological research also comes
through the military—for example, through the Defense Advanced
402
This funding is concerned with
Research Projects Agency.
403
developing technologies to promote national security.
When otherwise-copyrightable works are produced pursuant to
these grants, the copyright law does not speak expressly about
whether such works are copyrightable. The legislative history to the
1976 revision of the Copyright Act, however, states that either
Congress or the agency responsible for the funding may decide
whether to allow the funded party to secure copyright in the funded
404
works. Nonetheless, one commentator points to a federal policy
405
“favoring broad copyrightability in federally supported works.”
Following federal grants in both arts and sciences, the government
typically allows the grantee to copyright resulting work—including
articles discussing research—with the government reserving a royalty406
free, nonexclusive license.
399. Id.
400. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 241, 282 (2006) (empowering the director of the National Institutes of
Health to undertake research activities).
401. NIH Budget, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2012).
402. See generally History, DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, http://www.
darpa.mil/About/History/History.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (providing a brief overview of
the history of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and including links to further
information).
403. See Our Work, DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, http://www.darpa.
mil/our_work (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (“The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) was established in 1958 to prevent strategic surprise from negatively impacting U.S.
national security and create strategic surprise for U.S. adversaries by maintaining the
technological superiority of the U.S. military.”).
404. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 59 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5672.
Opponents of copyright protection maintain that it is a “double subsidy” atop the funding that
spurred the creation, whereas proponents argue that it is an important incentive to funded
works’ “creation and dissemination.” E.g., id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally
Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Research: Necessary Incentive or
Double Subsidy?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 613, 648–71 (2004) (summarizing “the initial
reactions . . . from the various stakeholders” to a bill proposed by Representative Martin Olav
Sabo in 2003 that would have amended the copyright rules applicable to federally funded
works).
405. Trosow, supra note 404, at 621–22.
406. E.g., Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements with
Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations (OMB
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Since 1980, patent law has similarly allowed nonprofit, university,
and small-business grantees to patent inventions resulting from
federal grants after the inventors have complied with various
407
formalities. Before this scheme was implemented, the federal
government would typically own the rights to these inventions and
would either commit them to the public domain or freely license
408
resulting patents nonexclusively to interested parties.
Could this extensive funding of artistic and scientific works be
unconstitutional in light of the IP Clause’s external limitations?
Recall that the Founders rejected just this sort of funding as a means
409
of promoting the progress of science and useful arts, and the First
Congress was worried about its constitutional ability to fund scientific
410
research. Nonetheless, even if the Spending Clause does not permit
this funding, the Necessary and Proper Clause likely does.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has rejected the notion that such
411
funding is unconstitutional. In an analysis directly contrary to this
Article’s reasoning, that court has reasoned that
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 does not state that the Government may promote the
progress of the useful arts only through the patent and copyright
system. Ample constitutional power for Government funding of
research and development can be found in art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (provide
for the common Defense and general Welfare), cl. 3 (Commerce), cl.
412
12 (Army), cl. 13 (Navy) and cl. 18 (necessary and proper clause).

Circular A-110), 2 C.F.R. § 215.36 (2011); NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NSF GRANT POLICY MANUAL,
at VII-16 to -17 (2005), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/manuals/gpm05_131/gpm05_131
.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, at IIA-85
to -87 (2011), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2011/nihgps_2011.pdf.
407. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, sec. 6, § 202, 94 Stat. 3015, 3020 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2006)).
408. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663 (1996)
(“[L]egislation [prior to a pair of statutes passed in 1980] had typically encouraged or required
that federal agencies sponsoring research make the results widely available to the public
through government ownership or dedication to the public domain.”). The law was changed to
improve the dissemination of inventions resulting from funded research by providing a greater
incentive to commercialize. S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 3 (1979).
409. See supra Part I.B.1.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 116–27.
411. Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
412. Id.
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The court then concluded that federal funding for research and
413
development also falls within the Spending Clause’s purview.
Yet as this Article maintains, the text, structure, history, judicial
doctrine, and policy surrounding the IP Clause yield a plausible
argument that the Spending Clause is in fact limited externally by the
414
IP Clause. If that argument is correct, then federal funding of
artistic and scientific works—which is done to promote the progress
of science and useful arts—would seem to be impermissible because it
falls outside of the IP Clause’s limited means. At the same time,
however, given how expansively the Supreme Court has interpreted
415
the Spending Clause, the Court very well might not allow the IP
Clause to limit Congress’s spending power.
In any event, federal funding of artistic and scientific works, as
typically structured, is almost certainly constitutionally authorized by
the Necessary and Proper Clause. As I analyze in Part II.B.3, the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to promote the
progress of science and useful arts through means other than those
specified in the IP Clause, but only to support the Clause’s means for
416
the specified end. Accordingly, as conventionally structured, federal
funding of artistic and scientific works seeks to promote the progress
of science and useful arts so as to secure exclusive rights to authors
and inventors for limited times in their works. It does so by providing
funding to authors and inventors to create their works in the first
place and by enabling them generally—although not requiring
them—to seek copyright and patent protection in those works as
417
further incentive to create and disseminate them. That congruency

413. Id.
414. See supra Part II.B.2.
415. See supra Part II.B.2.
416. See supra Part II.B.3.
417. I do not mean to say that any and all means not enabled by the IP Clause can be
enacted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. Some means are too tenuously related to
the IP Clause’s means and ends to qualify. For example, something maintained as a trade secret
cannot be patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (disallowing an inventor a patent when
“another inventor . . . establishes . . . that before [the filing person’s] invention thereof the
invention was made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed”
(emphasis added)); Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1038–39 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“Even though there is no explicit disclosure requirement in § 102(g), the spirit and policy of the
patent laws encourage an inventor to take steps to ensure that ‘the public has gained knowledge
of the invention which will insure its preservation in the public domain’ or else run the risk of
being dominated by the patent of another.” (quoting Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1387
(C.C.P.A. 1973))). Because a trade secret cannot lead to a patent except in a tenuous way,

FROMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/19/2012 8:25 PM

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE

1413

between the IP Clause’s means and ends is as much as the Necessary
and Proper Clause requires; by maintaining that congruency, the
Necessary and Proper Clause enables a law that is “‘convenient, or
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the [underlying] authority’s ‘beneficial
418
exercise.’” In fact, federal funding for scientific works was perhaps
more constitutionally problematic before 1980, when rights to
research vested in the federal government, not in inventors. When
that vesting occurred, the funding was not promoting exclusive rights
to inventors, as the Necessary and Proper Clause seems to require
when constrained by the IP Clause’s external limitations.
In sum, the vast practice of federal funding of artistic and
scientific works, as commonly structured, seems to lie well within
Congress’s authority.
*

*

*

As this Part shows, the constitutionality of a number of federal
laws is left in doubt by the IP Clause’s external limitations,
particularly the federal trade-secrecy and antibootlegging laws. By
contrast, federal funding of artistic and scientific works is likely
constitutional. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
IP Clause in upholding the copyright-restoration laws obviated any
clash between the IP Clause and other constitutional sources of
congressional authority. Even when the analytical framework
proposed herein does not yield an obvious, clear-cut answer as to a
law’s constitutionality, as it does with the proposed databaseprotection legislation, the framework still sharpens and focuses the
issues to be resolved.
CONCLUSION
This Article relies on the text, structure, and history of the IP
Clause, as well as subsequent governmental activity, Supreme Court
doctrine, and policy, to show that the IP Clause operates to forbid
Congress from using its other powers “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts” through laws that reach beyond the scope of
the IP Clause’s prescription to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors

protection of trade secrecy, see supra Part III.A, cannot be proper under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
418. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 418 (1819)).
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and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” This evidence shows that if Congress seeks, via
legislation, to promote the progress of science and useful arts, the
only way it can do so is by enacting laws that secure to authors and
inventors exclusive rights in their writings and discoveries for limited
times. This Article provides an analytical framework under which
courts, legislators, and others could assess the constitutionality of
federal legislation. If the structural purpose of a law is to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, the law may use only the means
specified in the IP Clause to pursue that purpose. This understanding
of external limitations imposed by the IP Clause yields varying
collisions with other constitutional provisions, primarily the
Commerce, Spending, and Necessary and Proper Clauses and the
treaty powers. To evaluate laws that have multiple constitutional
purposes, a presumption ought to exist against the constitutionality of
laws that promote the IP Clause’s ends but subvert its means, a
presumption that may be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence that Congress intentionally chose to supersede the IP
Clause’s means because of paramount, legitimate interests pursuant
to its other more permissive powers. This presumption ought to be
extremely difficult to overcome when a law’s means interfere with the
IP Clause’s means instead of merely diverging from the means
included in the IP Clause. This Article’s framework suggests that a
number of existing federal laws, such as federal trade-secrecy
provisions and antibootlegging laws, might be unconstitutional. The
framework also suggests how to assess the constitutionality of laws
that would protect databases, laws passed pursuant to international
agreements, and federal funding for scientific and artistic works.

